



2026 GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES

JOINT ANALYSIS FOR BETTER DECISIONS

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MID-YEAR UPDATE

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Partners



Abbreviations

AMN	acute malnutrition	PBW	pregnant and breastfeeding women
ASAP	Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production	PIN	people in need
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security	SADC	Southern African Development Community
CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel	SAM	severe acute malnutrition
CH	Cadre Harmonisé	SBA	Sana'a-Based Authorities
CTG	Core Technical Group	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
EC-JRC	European Commission – Joint Research Centre	TWG	Technical Working Group
EU	European Union	UN	United Nations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
GAM	global acute malnutrition	USD	United States dollar
GDP	gross domestic product	WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
GFSC	Global Food Security Cluster	WFP	World Food Programme
GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster	WB	World Bank
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises		
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises		
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan		
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre		
IDP	internally displaced persons		
IOM	International Organization for Migration		
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute		
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa)		
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification		
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition		
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		
ODA	official development assistance		
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development		

Accompanying resources

Below are links to the underlying GRFC 2026 Mid-year Update Appendices including country overviews, and the GRFC 2026 Technical Notes with detailed data for users who require more information.

[GRFC 2026 Mid-year Update Appendices](#)

[GRFC 2026 Technical notes](#)

GRFC 2026 MID-YEAR UPDATE: KEY FINDINGS



During the first half of the year, through August 2026, **acute food insecurity remained very high across the 39 countries and territories with available data**, driven primarily by conflict, insecurity, and weather extremes, and compounded by rising food and fertilizer prices. While conditions improved in the Gaza Strip and parts of the Sudan, these gains remained limited, uneven and fragile. Additional setbacks, not yet reflected in the available data, are expected in late 2026 and 2027 owing to the ongoing **conflict in the Middle East, El Niño conditions and reduced humanitarian funding**.



Improvements can be observed in 17 countries/territories from 2025 to August 2026, but progress remains uneven and fragile. Decreases in the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) are observed in parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Myanmar, parts of the Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe. At the same time, a deterioration was reported in 15 countries – particularly Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria and Somalia.



In 2026, a risk of Famine was identified in four countries/territories at some point during the year – Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Gaza Strip (through April 2026) – reflecting highly volatile conditions. Three – Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan – continued to face this risk as of mid-2026. Nonetheless, overall, the number of people facing Catastrophe conditions (IPC/CH Phase 5) fell compared with 2025. However, the reduction is on account of improvements in a few specific locations (Sudan and Gaza) where conflict and insecurity decreased and people in need had better access to humanitarian assistance.



New data indicate deepening nutrition crises in several countries. Areas in Kenya, Somalia and South Sudan reached Extremely Critical (IPC Acute Malnutrition [AMN] Phase 5) levels of acute malnutrition. The nutrition situation improved in the Gaza Strip and Madagascar, although in both contexts, nutrition vulnerability remains high.



The number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises fell in the first half of 2026. However, the decline has not lessened humanitarian needs, as many people have returned to home contexts that remain very fragile. Additionally, renewed large-scale conflict-driven displacement occurred in some countries with food crises, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Lebanon. Acute food insecurity remains high among forcibly displaced populations, affecting over one-third and, in some cases, up to half of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across multiple food crisis settings.



The ongoing El Niño event is expected to strengthen in the second half of 2026 and to persist into early 2027, increasing climate-related risks across Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean and potentially offsetting the agricultural production gains achieved in some regions in early 2026.



Ongoing conflict in the Middle East has raised the risks of further deterioration of acute food insecurity in countries with food crises, through higher fuel and fertilizer costs, supply chain disruptions and upward pressures on domestic food prices. Food availability and access are expected to

decline if input prices continue to rise, reducing farm profitability and agricultural production. In addition, further increases in food and fuel prices could erode the purchasing power of vulnerable populations. These impacts are likely to be even more pronounced in 2027 as the effects of disrupted fertilizer supplies and higher input costs materialize across subsequent agricultural production cycles.



Humanitarian funding has continued to decline in 2026 – though less steeply than in 2025 – causing significant shortfalls, while development funding is also facing continued reduction. Food security improvements due to reduced conflict and improved access to assistance took place in an overall fragile context where assistance remains unevenly distributed, and often does not reach populations in need. Gains therefore remain limited in scale and could be quickly reversed if funding continues to decline or access deteriorates, particularly in a scenario of increasing farm input costs and consumer food prices and new occurrences of weather extremes.



Funding constraints compound data collection challenges in countries facing food crisis. In 2025, 18 countries and territories selected for the GRFC did not have acute food insecurity data, with at least five of them facing data gaps due to limited funding. In 2026, while efforts to expand data collection through remote methods and other alternative approaches have helped to address some information gaps and to reduce the number of cancelled IPC analyses, significant data collection challenges remain requiring additional resources to address these.



Mobile water tanks protecting livestock's water supply. Gaza. © FAO

1. Evolution of acute food insecurity in 2026


This report provides a partial update for 39 countries and territories out of the 47 countries covered in the GRFC 2026 that have acute food insecurity data in 2026, including 33 countries that had directly comparable data for 2025–2026. Eight countries do not yet have data for 2026 available but continue to face shocks.^a

As of August 2026, the available data points to an improvement in 17 countries/territories from 2025 to 2026, with the largest decreases in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent) occurring in parts of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Myanmar**, parts of the **Sudan, Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**, and to a deterioration in 15 countries – particularly **Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria** and **Somalia**.

^a The IPC/CH analyses in 17 of the 39 countries were produced in late 2025 or early 2026 and do not yet consider the impact of the conflict in the Middle East and El Niño. The analysis for the Democratic Republic of the Congo does not yet consider the impact of Ebola. New IPC/CH analyses are expected to be released for at least 32 countries and territories during the remainder of 2026. The data cut-off date for this report was 31 August 2026. No 2026 acute food insecurity data was available for Colombia, Egypt (refugees), Guinea-Bissau, Iraq (refugees), Jordan (refugees), Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ukraine. For Palestine, while 2026 data were available for the Gaza Strip, no data were available for the West Bank.

Figure 1.1 Change in number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity

Countries/territories with comparable data from 2025 peak to anticipated 2026 peak, based on analyses and projections available as of August 2026. Percentage change (%); Change in numbers (millions)



Notes: This graph covers 33 countries/territories for which the 2025–2026 acute food insecurity data available are comparable, including the fact that it reflects the peak of acute food insecurity during the year, e.g. lean season. The acute food insecurity data for 2025 and 2026 is not considered comparable for Chad (refugees), Kenya (refugees), Mauritania (refugees), Mozambique, Pakistan, Uganda, and United Republic of Tanzania. For Afghanistan and Yemen, the 2025 and 2026 peak figures straddle both years and refer to the same IPC analyses. For Bangladesh, Chad, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip) and Zambia, only the areas commonly analysed across both years are shown in this graph. For Djibouti, the population analysed has been revised from 1.2 million people (2025) to 1.0 million people (2026). For Cameroon, the data in this graph compares Jun–Aug 2025 and Jun–Aug 2026, though the 2025 peak of acute food insecurity was reported in October–December 2025.

Source: GRFC Core Technical Group (CTG), based on IPC Technical Working Groups 2025–2026, IPC Global Initiative 2025–2026, CH 2025–2026, FEWS NET 2025–2026, and Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar HNRP 2026.

1.1 Countries/territories with deterioration in acute food insecurity in 2026

Nigeria saw the most substantial deterioration – nearly 5 million more people in CH Phase 3 or above than in 2025 – driven mainly by conflict and insecurity in northern states, including an increase from 1.2 million to 2.1 million people facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) in the northern states and from 0 to 10 300 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno state. This is compounded by continued macroeconomic challenges, global economic shocks and climate-related pressure on agriculture and livelihoods.¹

In **Bangladesh**, a marginal deterioration is expected by the end of 2026 – a 1 percent point increase from 2025 in the share of the analysed population facing IPC Phase 3 or above (around 1.9 million more people) – driven by economic pressures, external economic shocks and cyclone risks.²

In East Africa, **Kenya**, **Somalia** and **South Sudan** saw acute food insecurity worsen. In Kenya and Somalia, the sharp deterioration is mainly due to poor rainfall, rising food prices and insecurity, which have weakened livelihoods, constrained food access and increased household vulnerability – against a backdrop of reduced humanitarian assistance.^{3,4} Below-average rainfall is forecast in the northern and western areas of the region between July and September, linked to strengthening El Niño conditions. This is expected to negatively affect crop and livestock production. At the same time, El Niño and a developing positive Indian Ocean Dipole are likely to bring above-average rainfall and heightened flood risks to eastern parts of the region during the October–December season.⁵

In **Madagascar**, a deterioration is expected to result from the delayed effects of cyclones and unfavourable climate conditions associated with El Niño, which is projected to negatively affect food supplies, compounded by insufficient humanitarian assistance coverage.⁶

1.2 Countries/territories with improvements in acute food insecurity in 2026

In the **Sudan**, despite significant improvement where security has stabilized – including Al Jazirah, Kassala, Khartoum and Sennar states – extreme food insecurity persists, driven by protracted conflict, mass displacement, high food prices, collapsing health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) systems and severe humanitarian access constraints. This has left millions with limited access to food, services and livelihoods, most worryingly in Greater Darfur and Kordofan.^{a,7} In contrast to 2024 and 2025, the ongoing agropastoral season is expected to perform poorly due to significant rainfall deficits and forecast dry conditions for the rest of the season.⁸ According to the IPC analysis released in May 2026, the acute food insecurity situation was expected to deteriorate in June–September 2026, though no country-wide projection was available at the time of writing.

Malawi and **Zimbabwe** experienced lower levels of acute food insecurity during the lean-season in the first quarter of 2026 than a year earlier, largely due to improved agricultural production in 2024/25 following

^a In the Sudan, conclusions regarding trends in acute food insecurity over time and across areas should be interpreted with caution. This is due to large-scale population movements, access constraints and variations in primary data coverage across successive IPC analyses. According to the IPC analysis released in May 2026, the acute food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate in June–September 2026, though no country-wide projection was available at the time of writing.

the El Niño-affected 2023/24 season which severely constrained food availability.^{9,10}

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, national-level food security improved overall – marked by a prolonged decrease in inflation, localized security improvements and favourable rainfall in late 2025. However, the population in IPC Phase 3 or above was expected to increase in Ituri and South Kivu provinces. Notably, the latest projections do not yet account for the recent Ebola outbreak, which is expected to further constrain livelihoods, trade and market access. This will exacerbate already high levels of acute food insecurity (see p. 9 for further details).^{11,12}


In **Lebanon**, the latest IPC projection indicates an overall improvement compared to the 2025 peak, though gains made in late 2025 have largely reversed through August 2026 amid renewed conflict.¹³

In **Chad**, acute food insecurity decreased slightly among residents, supported by above-average 2025 agricultural production despite marked regional variations in rainfall conditions.¹⁴ Nevertheless, acute food insecurity remained high in areas affected by insecurity, displacement, and weather extremes, particularly in the east and west.^{15,16}

Across the Sahel, persistent insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin and the Liptako-Gourma tri-border area continues to disrupt livelihoods, displacement dynamics, market functioning and agricultural activities, constraining recovery prospects despite localized improvements in food security.¹⁷

Across the Central American Dry Corridor, despite some limited improvements in **Guatemala**, acute food insecurity continues to be driven by recurrent climatic

Figure 1.2 Famine, risk of Famine and population in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5), in 2026



Note: Numbers refer to the peak period of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above). In the Sudan, the peak of acute food insecurity was reached in February–May 2026, with 135 000 people in IPC Phase 5, while the highest number of people in in IPC Phase 5 from the same analysis was reported in June–September 2026 (200 000 people).
Source: IPC Technical Working Groups (TWGs) 2025/2026, IPC Global Initiative 2025/2026 and CH 2026.

shocks, depleted food stocks, high food prices and production costs, constrained incomes and purchasing power, and limited livelihood opportunities among vulnerable rural households.^{18, 19, 20}

1.3 Countries/territories with populations in Catastrophe and risk of Famine in 2026

As of August 2026, around 327 000 people were expected to face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) across five countries/territories at some point in 2026: the Gaza Strip, Nigeria, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen. This represents a sharp decline from 1.4 million people who experienced IPC/CH Phase 5 in 2025, mainly reflecting reduced conflict and insecurity and improved humanitarian access in the Gaza Strip and the Sudan. Improvements were also observed in Haiti and Mali,

where no populations were classified in IPC/CH Phase 5 in 2026, though new populations were projected to face Catastrophe in Borno state in Nigeria.

Despite the overall reduction of people in Catastrophe, a risk of Famine was identified in four countries and territories at some point in 2026 – Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and the Gaza Strip (through April 2026) – underscoring the extreme severity of food insecurity in these contexts. Three of these – Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan – continued to face a risk of Famine as of mid-2026. While the risk of Famine in the Gaza Strip in early 2026 was averted, recent gains remain highly fragile.

The Sudan continues to account for the largest IPC/CH Phase 5 population, with 200 000 people projected to face Catastrophe between June and

September 2026, up from 135 000 in February–May 2026. While substantially below the peak recorded in 2025 – mainly due to reduced conflict and improved access to assistance – conditions remain extremely severe, with a risk of Famine identified in 14 areas through September 2026 and in 13 areas from October 2026 to January 2027.^{a, 21}


In South Sudan, 73 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe, with a credible risk of Famine in parts of Jonglei and Upper Nile states through July, should conflict intensify and humanitarian access deteriorate.²² A new analysis covering the second half of 2026 is not yet available.

In Yemen, due to economic shocks, impacts of conflict and limited humanitarian access, 41 000 people were facing Catastrophe between September 2025 and February 2026 in areas controlled by Sana’a-based authorities in Al Hodeidah, Amran Governorate and Hajjah.²³ A new analysis for 2026 is only available for Government of Yemen-controlled areas.²⁴

In Nigeria – a crisis driven by conflict, displacement, limited livelihood opportunities and rising food prices – 10 000 people in four Local Government Areas of Borno state are projected to face Catastrophe between June and August 2026 if humanitarian assistance is not sustained.²⁵

The acute food insecurity situation has improved in the Gaza Strip since the October 2025 ceasefire; nevertheless, in early 2026, 2 000 people were classified in IPC/CH Phase 5, with the entire territory facing a risk of Famine due to the volatility of the situation.²⁶

a The Government of Sudan did not endorse this analysis

Figure 1.3 Top ten countries/territories with the largest number of people (millions) facing high levels of acute food insecurity by Phase, 2026 and 2025 peak

*Countries included in top 10 of largest number and share of high levels of acute food insecurity

Note: Proportion of the total country population analysed (where less than 90 percent): Bangladesh (57 percent); Nigeria (79 percent); Pakistan (21 percent). In Pakistan, the 2026 IPC analysis covered 45 rural districts in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh and six vulnerable rural districts in South Punjab, while the 2025 analysis covered 68 rural districts across Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh. In Nigeria, the number of states analysed increased from 26 and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in 2025 to 27 states and the FCT in 2026.

Source: IPC TWGs, 2025/2026; IPC Global Initiative, 2025/2026; Myanmar pre-analysis conducted under the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan; CH, 2025/2026; World Food Programme (WFP) (Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security), 2025. No 2026 update is yet available for the Syrian Arab Republic. Available peak data for Afghanistan and Yemen covers both 2025 and 2026; the same results are reported for both years.

The latest IPC analysis (from May 2026), however, found no population currently classified in Phase 5 and reported improved food security conditions. This reflects the reduced conflict and expanded humanitarian assistance.²⁷

In **Somalia**, no populations were classified in Catastrophe through June 2026, yet the situation remains critical. Risk of Famine was identified in Burhakaba district until June 2026, under a credible worst-case scenario of failing *Gu* rains, soaring food prices and reduced humanitarian assistance. The *Gu* 2026 rainy season (March–May) was marked by significant deficits and prolonged dry spells, especially in Puntland and parts of Somaliland, limiting drought recovery. Forecasts for the October–December 2026 season indicate a high likelihood of above-normal rainfall over central to southern Somalia, which may improve water and pasture conditions, but also heighten flood risks.^{28, 29} A new analysis covering the second half of 2026 is not yet available.

1.4 Largest and most severe food crises

A significant portion of acute food insecurity continues to be concentrated in a few large-scale, protracted crises. Five countries – **Afghanistan**, the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **South Sudan**, the **Sudan** and **Yemen** – rank among the ten countries with both the highest share and largest number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

Despite overall decreases in acute food insecurity in parts of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, **Myanmar** and the **Sudan** between 2025 and 2026, they remain among the ten countries with the largest populations in IPC Phase 3 or above, alongside **Bangladesh** and **Nigeria**. The number of people facing or expected to face



CH Phase 3 or above increased to 36 million in Nigeria. No 2026 update is yet available for the **Syrian Arab Republic**, which accounted for around 7 million people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2025.

Populations facing Emergency fell from 2025 levels in **Myanmar** and the **Sudan**, though the absolute number of people – and severity of acute food insecurity – remains high.

The five countries/territories with the highest prevalence of acute food insecurity remained unchanged in 2026. The **Gaza Strip** continued to record the highest share of the analysed population facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) in early 2026, at 77 percent. Despite an improvement to 59 percent in April–June 2026 – largely due to increased humanitarian assistance and reduced conflict intensity – conditions are projected to deteriorate to 67 percent in July–December 2026, underscoring the fragility of recent gains and dependency on humanitarian assistance. **South Sudan** (55 percent), **Yemen** (52 percent), **Haiti** (52 percent) and the **Sudan** (41 percent) continued to record around half of their analysed populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

Afghanistan (36 percent), **Somalia** (33 percent), **Central African Republic** (31 percent), **Lebanon**

(24 percent) and the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** (23 percent) complete the ten countries with the highest share of their analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity.

2. Acute malnutrition

Since the launch of the GRFC 2026, several countries/territories have seen their nutrition situation deteriorate, with only two showing improvement.

Per the latest IPC AMN analysis, the **Gaza Strip** no longer meets the nutrition crisis criteria, with all areas now classified in IPC AMN 1 or 2 – an improvement attributed to the scale-up of the humanitarian response, including prevention and treatment of acute malnutrition. However, poor child and maternal dietary quality and high levels of disease still indicate a high risk of rapid deterioration.³⁰ In addition, recent improvements remain fragile, as declining humanitarian assistance since February 2026 could rapidly worsen food security and nutrition outcomes among populations with depleted livelihoods and exhausted coping capacities.

In **Kenya**, acute malnutrition has worsened into a very severe nutrition crisis; four arid and semi-arid counties (Mandera, North Horr/Chalbi [Marsabit] and Turkana East and South) were classified in IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical) from October 2025 to February 2026; and Laisamis, projected to be in IPC AMN Phase 5 between March and June 2026.³¹

Somalia experienced a very severe nutrition crisis; most of the areas analysed (23 of 35) were projected to

Figure 2.1 Ranking of the severity of nutrition crises, updated with latest data, 2025-2026

	COUNTRY/TERRITORY	CHANGE SINCE Jan 2026
Very severe nutrition crises	Kenya (ASALs)	Deteriorated
	Myanmar	No new analysis
	Somalia	Deteriorated
	South Sudan	Deteriorated
	Sudan	No new analysis
Severe nutrition crises	Afghanistan	No new analysis
	Central African Republic	No new analysis
	Chad	Not comparable
	Chad (Refugees)	No new analysis
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	No new analysis
	Mali	Not comparable
	Niger	No new analysis
	Nigeria (Northeast, Northwest and Northcentral)	No new analysis
	Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh)	Deteriorated
	Uganda (48 of 148 districts)	Not comparable
Moderate nutrition crises	Burundi	No new analysis
	Djibouti	No new analysis
	Madagascar	Improved
	Mauritania	No new analysis
	Mozambique	Not comparable
	Uganda (Refugee and host populations)	No new analysis
No 2025 severity	Bangladesh	Not comparable
	Cameroon	No new analysis
	Yemen	No new analysis

Note: Nutrition crisis countries are grouped by severity, with countries listed alphabetically within each group. New IPC AMN analyses have been released since the GRFC 2026 for Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Mali, the Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Chad, Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda new IPC AMN analyses are not comparable across years because of the difference in the number of areas analysed. See Technical Notes (GRFC 2026, p. 28) for further details on methodology. Source: GRFC CTG using IPC AMN, IPC AFI, INFORM risk data.

deteriorate or remain stable within IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical).³² Burhakaba district in particular was classified in IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical) and at risk of Famine under the worst-case scenario of failing *Gu* rains from April to June 2026.

The acute malnutrition situation in **South Sudan** similarly deteriorated into a very severe nutrition crisis, with ten counties and the Abyei Administrative Area^a in IPC AMN Phase 5 (Extremely Critical), among which four counties (Lualpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Nyirol, and Akobo) were at risk of Famine from April to July 2026.³³ An additional ten counties have deteriorated into IPC AMN Phase 4, with a heightened risk of progressing into IPC AMN Phase 5 if current conditions do not improve.

Pakistan experienced a deterioration in nutritional conditions, moving from a nutrition concern to a severe nutrition crisis. The new IPC AMN analysis published in April reported high levels of acute malnutrition with 16 districts in IPC AMN Phase 4 (Critical) from April to September 2026 of the 45 districts of Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces.³⁴

The acute malnutrition situation in **Madagascar** improved to a moderate nutrition crisis, though the latest IPC AMN analysis notes persistent nutritional fragility in the south and southeast, driven by poor diets, high morbidity, poor access to health and basic services and prolonged, high levels of acute food insecurity.³⁵

The worsening trends reflect multiple converging factors – worsening acute food insecurity, high disease prevalence,


suboptimal infant and young child feeding practices and limited access to essential health, nutrition and WASH services. This is compounded by humanitarian access constraints and funding shortages that further undermine response efforts, heightening the risk of continued deterioration and increased morbidity and mortality.

3. Forced displacement

Population movements continue to shape food insecurity in 2026, both through large-scale returns to fragile contexts and renewed conflict-related displacement.

Return movements had already increased by about 49 percent in 2025 compared with 2024,³⁶ mostly in countries with food crises. While some returns reflect localized improvements in security, many were driven by deteriorating conditions in the areas where they were located – including insecurity, reduced livelihood opportunities and declining humanitarian assistance – leaving many households returning to areas where livelihoods, services and recovery prospects remain fragile. These returns do not necessarily indicate reduced humanitarian needs, and may in fact increase food security risks in already vulnerable contexts – putting additional stress on host communities too.

Forcibly displaced populations remain among the most acutely food-insecure groups in 2026. Across the eight countries with disaggregated data as of August, over 30 percent of forcibly displaced persons faced or are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity



A woman prepares a meal at Albuhih IDP camp, Sudan.
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in Bangladesh, Chad, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar and Uganda,^{37,38,39} over 40 percent in Mozambique and Somalia,^{40,41,42} over 50 percent in Kenya,⁴³ and over 70 percent in Djibouti, Haiti and the Sudan.^{44,45,46} In the Sudan, six IDP settlements in North Darfur and South Kordofan are at risk of Famine through January 2027.

The **Sudan** remains one of the world's largest displacement crises, with around 4.4 million return movements registered as of May 2026, including about

^a Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

776 000 returnees from outside the country.⁴⁷ Some returns followed relative security improvements in parts of Al Jazirah and Khartoum.⁴⁸ Returns increased during periods of intensified fighting in **South Sudan**,⁴⁹ while insecurity in eastern Chad and deteriorating humanitarian conditions are driving increased returns into Darfur.⁵⁰ Many returnees have arrived in areas where conflict, damaged infrastructure, disrupted livelihoods and constrained humanitarian access continue to undermine food security, particularly in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.⁵¹

In **Afghanistan**, as of August 2026, more than 6.4 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan since 2023 amid stricter migration policies in these countries, with additional returns expected in the second half of 2026.⁵² These large-scale returns are straining labour markets, livelihoods and basic services in areas where acute food insecurity and malnutrition are already widespread.⁵³

In **Lebanon**, the escalation in hostilities in the context of the Middle East crisis and large-scale displacement beginning in March 2026 sharply deteriorated the food security situation. More than 1 million people were displaced by late March 2026, disrupting livelihoods, income opportunities and access to markets, while straining already vulnerable host communities.⁵⁴ By June, the number of IDPs had started to decline as some households returned, though continued volatility could drive further population movements, keeping pressure on livelihoods, markets and food security in affected areas.

4. Emerging global and country-specific drivers of acute food insecurity in 2026

4.1 Global spillover effects of the Middle East conflict on countries/territories with food crises

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has increased acute food insecurity risks in countries with food crises in 2026, driving up fuel and fertilizer costs, causing supply chain disruptions and placing pressure on domestic food prices. Further volatility in these markets through the rest of 2026 could continue to erode household purchasing power, constrain agricultural production and increase needs among vulnerable populations.⁵⁵

The conflict has disrupted shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a major route for oil, liquefied natural gas and fertilizers, affecting global energy and input supply chains. The price of Brent crude oil remains very volatile and elevated, strongly driven by events related to the Middle East crisis. After declining from its USD 114 peak in May to USD 73 in June, it reached USD 100 again in July, and stands at USD 94 at the end of August.⁵⁶ The conflict could slow down the economies in the Middle East and reduce remittance inflows to vulnerable households across the subregion, Asia and the Horn of Africa.⁵⁷

Fertilizer markets show mixed signals. Fertilizer supply pressures for urea eased by June due to improved trade flows and lower energy costs, though affordability constraints persist in parts of the world. Prices for sulfur and phosphate remain high. The impact on agricultural

production is likely to be more pronounced in 2027.^{58, 59} Persistently high fertilizer costs could reduce use, lowering yields and food supplies.⁶⁰ Disruptions to maritime trade routes are also causing delays and raising the cost of humanitarian assistance amid severe funding constraints.⁶¹

In 2026, 11 GRFC countries selected for the GRFC, including the **Sudan**, **South Sudan** and **Haiti**, faced food inflation of more than 15 percent year-on-year, up from seven countries in December 2025.^{62, 63, 64} While the Middle East crisis is one contributing factor, food inflation in these countries also reflects other prolonged, context-specific drivers. Intensified hostilities in Ukraine, the Russian Federation and surrounding maritime corridors have contributed to climbing wheat prices in July and August, as sea shipping disruptions in the Black Sea tighten global supplies. Price pressures are also influenced by a decline in global wheat production due to drought in key wheat producing countries, including in North America and Europe.^{65, 66, 67} As of July 2026, the FAO Food Price Index was 1 percent higher than at the same time a year earlier – driven by weather concerns, rising energy prices and planting uncertainty amid higher input costs⁶⁸ – but remained 18.2 percent below its March 2022 peak.⁶⁹

Countries with food crises face significant structural vulnerabilities that heighten their exposure to global shocks, including the ongoing energy crisis linked to the conflict in the Middle East, while limiting their capacity to manage them. High import dependency, limited foreign exchange reserves, and constrained fiscal space characterize many of the economies covered in the GRFC.⁷⁰ Against this backdrop, rising global energy prices have increased the domestic costs of production,

processing and distribution of food, putting pressure on household purchasing power. These effects risk further exacerbating already elevated levels of acute food insecurity in countries with food crises.

In **Lebanon**, the **Syrian Arab Republic** and **Yemen**, high import dependency amplified the impact of rising transport, fuel and energy costs, contributing to increased prices of food, agricultural inputs and other essential commodities.^{71, 72, 73, 74, 75} In Lebanon the escalation in hostilities also drove large-scale displacement, further losses of livelihoods and weakening food access.⁷⁶

The **Sudan's** reliance on cereal, fuel and fertilizer imports from or through the Gulf leaves it highly exposed to shipping disruptions and rising fuel costs, worsening an already critical food security situation.^{77, 78} In

Afghanistan and **Somalia**, high import dependence, trade disruptions, higher transport and input costs, declining remittances and constrained livelihoods are compounding acute food insecurity risks.^{79, 80}


Bangladesh and **Pakistan** also depend largely on Gulf countries to access fertilizer and remittances.^{81, 82}

Overall, the conflict is raising food security risks and operational pressure by lowering capacities to produce or import food where it is most needed, while increasing needs and the cost of delivering assistance.

4.2 Expected impact of El Niño on agrifood systems in food crisis

The ongoing El Niño event is expected to persist through at least early 2027, increasing the likelihood of extreme weather events that could disrupt agricultural production, food systems and livelihoods, which would

Map 4.1 Locations and seasonal patterns of precipitation anomalies associated with El Niño



Note: This map shows broad regional climate anomalies relative to historical averages and forecast patterns. Forecast periods may vary across regions. As conditions can differ significantly within countries and regions, the map should be interpreted as a general overview rather than a detailed local forecast. Conditions within countries may differ from the regional patterns, including the simultaneous occurrence of drought and excessive rainfall in different areas. For more detailed maps on the El Niño risk indicators, please see [Appendix 3](#) and [Appendix 4](#) in the Appendices.

Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2026. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 1 July 2026]. <https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1>. Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Source: Adapted from: FEWS NET (Famine Early Warning Systems Network). 2026. 2020 El Niño and Precipitation, Agroclimatology Fact Sheet Series. Vol. 1. Washington, D.C. <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2025-08/White%20Paper%20-%20El%20Niño.pdf>

Orange box: Dry conditions Blue box: Wet conditions

be particularly detrimental to countries already facing food crises. The resulting impacts of drought, heat waves, excessive rainfall and floods are likely to reduce crop yields, increase livestock losses and drive up food prices, with food security consequences expected to extend well beyond the event itself.^{83, 84, 85, 86}

El Niño conditions are expected to intensify in the second half of 2026, heightening risks across parts of Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, with the most significant impacts on agricultural production likely to be felt in 2027.^{87, 88, 89}

In the **Horn of Africa**, rainfall variability threatens both agricultural and pastoral livelihoods: below-average rainfall is expected during critical growing periods in western Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Sudan and parts of Uganda and Kenya, above-average rains are forecast between October and December over most of the region, likely benefiting crop and livestock production, with a favourable impact on food security. However, excessive rains heighten the risk of flooding, and the expected localized livelihood losses are expected to significantly worsen the local food security situation in the most vulnerable areas, mainly Somalia and southeastern Ethiopia.^{90, 91, 92, 93, 94}

In **Southern Africa**, El Niño raises concerns over agricultural drought and reduced pasture availability in Angola, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, potentially undermining recent food security gains, though record 2026 harvests could partly cushion the impact expected in 2027.^{95, 96, 97, 98}

In **West Africa** and the **Sahel**, the 2026 rainy season is underway, with rainfall through the end of July showing mixed patterns across the Sahel. Localized dry spells in Chad, countries along the Gulf of Guinea, Mali, the Niger and northern Nigeria, have delayed planting and slowed crop development. The September to November seasonal outlook indicates an increased likelihood of above-average rainfall across much of coastal West Africa.⁹⁹ In contrast, below-average rainfall is forecast in parts of Chad, the Niger, Nigeria, and southern Cameroon, raising concerns about persistent rainfall deficits and their potential impact on crop development and livestock production.¹⁰⁰

In **Latin America and the Caribbean**, particularly the Dry Corridor and Haiti, El Niño-related dry conditions are expected to reduce agricultural production and exacerbate acute food insecurity. In the Central America Dry Corridor, acute food insecurity is projected to worsen during the July–November 2026 lean season and beyond, as intensifying El Niño conditions constrain crop production.^{101, 102, 103}

In **South and Southeast Asia**, intensifying El Niño conditions are expected to disrupt the 2026/27 agricultural season through below-average rainfall and above-average temperatures, potentially reducing crop production and amplifying pressure on food security in vulnerable rainfed areas across Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ Wetter-than-average conditions may raise localized flooding risks in Bangladesh and Myanmar¹⁰⁵ – which is already experiencing one of the year's most severe monsoon emergencies¹⁰⁶ – while above-average rainfall across much of Afghanistan and northern Pakistan is expected to benefit 2027 wheat production.¹⁰⁷

4.3 Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

The 2026 Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is compounding the effects of conflict, displacement and economic shocks in an area already facing high acute food insecurity.¹⁰⁸

By 20 August, 5 300 cases and more than 2 500 deaths had been reported in total since the outbreak began in May, making it the largest Ebola outbreak ever reported in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the fastest-spreading of any previous one during the

first months of exposure.^{109, 110} Containment measures, including movement restrictions, are disrupting livelihoods, trade and market access, particularly in conflict-affected areas with limited services and weakened resilience.¹¹¹ At the same time, acute food insecurity undermines containment measures, as people move to access income and food.

Regional risks extend to neighbouring Burundi, Central African Republic, Rwanda, South Sudan and Uganda – where cases have already been reported – through population movements and trade linkages,¹¹² potentially increasing food security risks in affected border areas.¹¹³

4.4 Earthquakes in Venezuela and Colombia

Amid a prolonged economic crisis and limited access to basic services,¹¹⁴ two major earthquakes struck the densely populated coastal areas near Caracas in north-central Venezuela on 24 June 2026. This caused nearly 6 300 deaths, affected 304 000 people as of mid-August,^{115, 116} and significantly increased humanitarian



needs. The OCHA July Rapid Needs Assessment and supporting analyses indicate a multisectoral emergency affecting food security, livelihoods, basic services, health, water, housing and population movements in earthquake-affected areas.¹¹⁷ Poor households in these areas face significant livelihood losses, with displaced families and those who lost income-earning members facing the greatest food security risks.¹¹⁸ A Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, led by the Government of Venezuela with support from the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean is ongoing as of early August.¹¹⁹

On 10 August 2026, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake struck central and western Colombia, causing widespread devastation. The disaster has resulted in significant loss of life, injuries, displacement risks, and extensive damage to homes, infrastructure, services, and livelihoods – affecting more than 186,000 people. As of 17 August, authorities reported 304 deaths and 4 400 injuries, while ongoing rapid assessments continue to refine the understanding of humanitarian needs and response priorities.¹²⁰

5. Update on 2026 humanitarian and development financing

Funding for humanitarian and development action remains severely constrained in 2026.

Net official development assistance (ODA) from Development Assistance Committee countries is projected to fall by a further 6.9 percent to

USD 152 billion in 2026 – the lowest level since 2014 and the third consecutive decline, following reductions of 8.5 percent in 2024 and 23.3 percent in 2025.¹²¹ While some progress against acute food insecurity was achieved in 2026 in some specific contexts notably thanks to improved access and deliveries of humanitarian assistance, funding to humanitarian and development assistance across countries with food crisis remain largely uneven and limited. Most of the poorest and most fragile countries are expected to remain disproportionately affected by the funding reductions projected in 2026.¹²²

The projected cuts affect sectors critical to addressing food insecurity and malnutrition, such as food aid and health. Humanitarian ODA is projected to fall by 40.3 percent between 2024 and 2026, while food aid – analysed separately – is expected to decline by 44.5 percent (USD 2.6 billion), weakening a critical source of support for acutely food insecure populations, particularly where humanitarian assistance is an important component of household food access.¹²³ The health sector is expected to face the largest reductions, falling below pre-pandemic levels, with especially steep cuts in population and reproductive health and communicable disease control – compounding the effects of inadequate diets and disease in countries with food crises.¹²⁴

Funding constraints are eroding food security and nutrition monitoring systems, undermining the evidence necessary to identify needs and target assistance effectively.¹²⁵ Emerging evidence from conflict-affected contexts, including parts of the Sudan, Gaza Strip, Yemen, Myanmar, Haiti, Somalia and the Sahel,

Concerns for data availability in 2026



Strengthening data collection and analysis. Cameroon.
© FAO/Alexander Ford

A key limitation of the 2026 GRFC was persistently limited data availability in 2025, resulting in the fewest countries covered in a decade. Eighteen countries and territories selected for the GRFC did not have acute food insecurity data with at least five of them facing data gaps due to limited funding. Since then, efforts to expand data collection through remote methods and other alternative approaches such as the nutrition vulnerability analysis (NVA) in some countries have helped address some information gaps and are expected to reduce the number of IPC analyses cancelled in 2026. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain, and sustained investment in food security and nutrition monitoring systems is essential to maintain the evidence base required for early alert, effective response and resource allocation.

suggests that food security conditions are becoming increasingly difficult to assess as access constraints, insecurity, and reduced funding limit the availability and quality of information.¹²⁶

Projected reductions in UN core funding are also expected to constrain humanitarian, nutrition, agriculture and food security assistance in many countries with food crises. This could affect the scale, continuity and flexibility of support, particularly in protracted crises.¹²⁷ Reduced financing also limits investments in preparedness, resilience-building and anticipatory action initiatives, potentially increasing future humanitarian needs and response costs.¹²⁸

Within this broader trajectory, the *Global Humanitarian Assistance 2026* report presented two scenarios for public humanitarian funding, both projecting a further decline in 2026, but at a slower pace than in 2025: from 2025 to 2026, funding would fall by 2 percent to USD 26.2 billion under the optimistic scenario, or by 11 percent to USD 23.8 billion under the pessimistic scenario.¹²⁹ While uncertain, both scenarios suggested humanitarian funding would remain well below its 2022 peak.

Preliminary mid-year figures provide some early indications of the 2026 funding picture, but should be interpreted cautiously as they do not necessarily predict the eventual full-year funding level. Data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs' (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) through 30 June 2026 show USD 15.26 billion in reported and processed funding – up 42.4 percent from USD 10.72 billion at the same

point in 2025 and 18.2 percent from USD 12.91 billion in 2024.¹³⁰ This was driven mainly by stronger support for appeals under the Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO), with funding reaching USD 10.59 billion – the highest of the three comparable mid-year reporting points. By contrast, funding outside the GHO remained broadly unchanged from 2025, at USD 4.67 billion.¹³¹

The comparatively stronger mid-year position should also be considered alongside substantially reduced humanitarian requirements: GHO requirements fell to USD 33.65 billion in 2026, well below the previous two years, not reflecting reduced needs, but due mostly to prioritization efforts. Combined with the higher level of funding reported at mid-year, this raised overall coverage to 31.5 percent by the end of June and coverage of prioritized requirements to 42.3 percent – largely because prioritization lowered the funding target while reported funding remained broadly stable.¹³²

While the full-year trajectory remains uncertain, funding for food assistance, nutrition and emergency agriculture continues to be affected by funding gaps and competing humanitarian priorities, with sector-specific outcomes depending on the timing and targeting of resources. Significant gaps remain against both overall and prioritized requirements, underscoring the importance of strategic alignment and coordinated action to protect food security, nutrition and broader development gains.^{133, 134}

Countries and territories where deterioration is expected through November 2026

According to the latest edition of the FAO–WFP Hunger Hotspots report released in June 2026, acute food insecurity is likely to worsen across 13 countries, territories and situations through November 2026, prompting an early warning for urgent humanitarian action.

Armed conflict and violence remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity, affecting 12 of the 13 countries, territories and situations, including every hotspot of highest concern. At the same time, global economic stress – characterized by slower growth, renewed inflationary pressures and conflict-related shocks to energy, freight and fertilizer markets – continues to compound vulnerabilities, deepening acute food insecurity across several hotspots. Weather extremes and increasing climate variability are further intensifying acute food insecurity. Climate forecasts reflecting El Niño conditions point to uneven rainfall patterns that may disrupt agricultural production.

The next edition of the FAO–WFP Hunger Hotspots report, covering the outlook period from December 2026 to May 2027, will be released in late November 2026.

Note: The Hunger Hotspots of “highest concern” category includes those facing Famine or a risk of Famine, and populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/ CH Phase 5). It also covers hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, where people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) are facing worsening conditions, exacerbated by severe humanitarian access constraints that could lead to an escalation in acute food insecurity and the occurrence of catastrophic conditions during the outlook period. The Hunger Hotspots of “very high concern” category includes those where sizeable populations – more than 500 000 people or over 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or are identified as severely food insecure as per the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology; and where the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe food insecurity (based on WFP’s CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period, based on the latest data available, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots. FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity: June to November 2026 outlook*. <https://doi.org/10.4060/ce0155en>

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