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Organization of the
United Nations



World Food
Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings
on acute food insecurity
June to November 2026 outlook



**Global Network
Against Food Crises**
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS



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Map of early warning hunger hotspots: June to November 2026



Source of data: WFP and FAO. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to November 2026)*. Rome.

Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2025. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 7 April 2025]. <https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1>. Refer to the disclaimer on page ii for the names and boundaries used in this map. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined.

Note: The displacement icon is used when displacement is a key driver of acute food insecurity, or when it is a significant factor contributing to vulnerability, even if not a direct driver. It applies to internally displaced persons as well as migrants and refugees.

Abbreviations

AMN	Acute Malnutrition
CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	gross domestic product
GIEWS	Global Information and Early Warning System
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GoY	Government of Yemen
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
IDP	internally displaced person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
LGA	local government area
SBA	Sana'a-based authorities (Yemen)
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme



Executive summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identify 13 hunger hotspots in this analysis covering June to November 2026 where acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period, prompting an early warning for urgent humanitarian action.

Compared with the previous edition, the **Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen** and **Palestine** remain at the highest level of concern. **Yemen** remains one of the world's worst food security crises, hosting the largest population facing Emergency (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase 4 or worse) levels of food insecurity globally. Risks are expected to deepen further, especially in hotspot areas if humanitarian assistance is not provided at scale. **Nigeria** has been newly added to this group following projections indicating that populations in Borno State may face Catastrophe (Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity during the outlook period. **Somalia** has also been added, with populations in Burhakaba District facing a risk of Famine. These contexts demand the most immediate attention.

A risk of Famine persists or was identified in four countries or territories in 2026. In the **Sudan**, a risk of Famine was identified in 14 areas in North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan through September 2026, and expected to persist in 13 areas during the harvest through to January 2027. Similarly, according to the latest analysis in **South Sudan**, four counties in Jonglei and Upper Nile states are projected to face a risk of Famine through July 2026. In addition, the entire **Gaza Strip** faced a risk of Famine through mid-April 2026 – though no projection was available covering the outlook period at the time of writing – and a risk of Famine was identified in one location in the Bay region of **Somalia** through June 2026.

Afghanistan and the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** remain hotspots of very high concern. The Ebola outbreak reported in May in the Democratic Republic of the Congo poses an additional risk to livelihoods and may further worsen acute food insecurity. **Haiti** has been added to this list and is no longer classified as a hotspot of highest concern, as it is now assessed to face a less severe risk, reflecting recent – though limited and localized – improvements mainly due to a slowdown in annual inflation,

generally favourable winter agricultural conditions, and improved access along some road corridors.

Lebanon and **Madagascar** have been added to the list of hotspots as a result of the escalation of hostilities in late February 2026 and adverse, erratic weather conditions, respectively, while **Myanmar** has been reclassified from a hotspot of very high concern to a hotspot. **Mali** remains a hotspot, but it is no longer classified as a hotspot of highest concern due to a reduction in the number of people projected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity during the outlook period.

Armed conflict and violence remain the primary drivers of acute food insecurity, affecting 12 of the 13 contexts. At the same time, **global economic stress** – characterized by slower growth, renewed inflationary pressures and conflict-related shocks to energy, freight and fertilizer markets – **continues to compound vulnerabilities**, deepening acute food insecurity across several hotspots. **Weather extremes and increasing climate variability are further intensifying acute food insecurity**. Climate forecasts indicate a transition towards El Niño conditions during the outlook period, likely resulting in uneven rainfall patterns that may disrupt agricultural production.

Despite escalating needs, humanitarian assistance to food sectors in crisis contexts has declined by an estimated 59 percent between 2022 and 2025, returning to levels last seen in 2016–2017. This decline comes at a time when the share of the population analysed facing high levels of acute food insecurity has doubled globally.

Funding gaps are already aggravating acute food insecurity and malnutrition in many contexts. At the same time, reductions in assessments, monitoring and analytical capacity are weakening the evidence base needed for effective prioritization of assistance and operational

decision-making, particularly in underfunded, high-risk contexts.

In this constrained environment, **stronger collaboration between humanitarian and development actors is essential to maximize impact and avoid fragmented responses. Enhanced coordination is needed not only to address immediate needs, but also to tackle the underlying drivers of food insecurity. Investments in resilience-building interventions remain vital** for populations heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance and most vulnerable to funding reductions.

Preventing famine must be central to these efforts.

Modern famines are almost always human-made, foreseeable and preventable. Famine is often the result of conflict and constraints on access, and exacerbated by critical gaps in collective response, including weak coordination, delayed action, and insufficient funding.

Addressing these gaps requires greater coherence in political commitments, funding allocations and

programming across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. Acting early – when signs of acute food insecurity and malnutrition emerge – is essential, alongside sustained support to livelihoods and improved access to basic services.

Against this backdrop, **urgent, targeted humanitarian action is needed to save lives and livelihoods across all identified hotspots**, especially those of highest concern, to prevent starvation and further loss of life. At the same time, greater investment in anticipatory action is needed to mitigate emerging risks and reduce the impact of disasters.

Early intervention not only saves lives but also minimizes food gaps and protects assets and livelihoods at substantially lower cost than delayed responses. To support this, **the report provides country-specific recommendations for immediate emergency responses alongside anticipatory measures** designed to meet urgent needs while preventing further deterioration.



Introduction

In this report covering June to November 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) identify 13 hunger hotspots.

These are marked by very high levels of acute food insecurity, with conditions expected to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period compared with a similar timeframe one year earlier.


Compared with the previous edition, published in November 2025, **Lebanon** and **Madagascar** have been added to the list of hotspots. **Lebanon** has been included following its last appearance in the November 2024 to May 2025 edition, as a result of the escalation in hostilities since late February 2026, which has disrupted transport, damaged infrastructure, increased fuel costs, resulted in higher food prices and driven large-scale population displacement. **Madagascar** was last included as a hotspot in the October 2022 to January 2023 edition, and was included in this edition due to adverse and erratic weather conditions and cyclone damage, increasing

the likelihood of a second consecutive below-average national paddy harvest.

Since the hunger hotspot categories were established in June 2022, 11 countries and territories have been selected as hunger hotspots of highest concern. Among them, **Haiti**, **Mali**, **Palestine**, **South Sudan**, the **Sudan** and **Yemen** were at the highest level of concern for at least five of the past nine editions. **South Sudan** has remained consistently in this category since this classification was established.

In this edition, **Angola**, **Burkina Faso**, **Cameroon**, **Chad**, **Cuba**, the **Dry Corridor of Central America**, **Ethiopia**, **Guinea**, **Iran (Islamic Republic of)**, the **Niger**, **Pakistan**, the situation of **Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh**, **Sierra Leone** and the **Syrian Arab Republic** are classified as requiring monitoring.

Figure 1. Categories of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Methodology

The identification of hunger hotspots is based on a forward-looking analysis that highlights where acute food insecurity is most likely to worsen significantly.


This process is grounded in consensus among food security experts, conflict analysts, economists and climate and natural hazard specialists, including early warning and anticipatory action experts from both FAO and WFP, at headquarters and in the field. Hotspot identification is informed by an initial prioritization using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators, as shown in Figure 2.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC/CH data to assess populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Where recent IPC/CH data are not available, estimates are derived from WFP's CARI methodology, where available. Populations classified as moderately or severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation of populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

Additional sources include estimates of people in need of food and livelihoods assistance from the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).¹

The Hunger Hotspots report is an early warning, forward-looking publication that identifies areas where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate significantly during the outlook period. As such, it does not cover all countries, territories or situations experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity or protracted crises. In some cases, inclusion is constrained by limited data availability, data that do not meet the technical requirements of the analysis, or insufficient evidence on key drivers and contextual trends indicating a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity. Further details are available in the hotspot selection process appendix at the end of the report. The cutoff date for analysis and information in this report was 5 June 2026.

Figure 2. Qualitative and quantitative indicators used to provide the Hunger Hotspots analysis



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Anticipatory action and emergency response

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods across all hunger hotspots. In hotspots of highest concern, such action is critical to prevent starvation and loss of life.

To support this, the report provides recommendations for anticipatory action and emergency response, tailored to the identified risks:

- **Anticipatory action** refers to short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented in the critical window between an early-warning trigger – when forecasts indicate a likely hazard – and the impact of that hazard on lives and livelihoods. These actions aim to protect the most vulnerable populations and their livelihoods before a shock occurs. In protracted crises, anticipatory action is recommended where appropriate.

- **Emergency response** involves actions aimed at addressing current or emerging humanitarian needs. The amount and duration of emergency assistance are determined through rapid assessments that provide information on food security and nutrition needs. Emergency response actions are, where relevant, adapted from interventions outlined in Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).

Given the extended outlook period of this report, recommendations for both anticipatory action and emergency response are indicative. They are intended for implementation only if early-warning triggers are met or clear early-warning signs emerge. Some recommendations also include preparedness measures, which are crucial for enabling the timely and effective implementation of anticipatory action and emergency response.

Note: Anticipatory action recommendations are included only when the risk analysis identifies a hazard or shock that is likely to occur but has not yet materialized during the outlook period. If a hazard or shock has already impacted agricultural livelihoods and food security, the window for anticipatory action is considered closed – even if the effects are expected to persist into the present and future. In such cases, this report includes only emergency response recommendations.

Figure 3. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	URGENT ACTION REQUIRED to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en). A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

Source: IPC. 2021. *IPC Technical Manual 3.1. Evidence and Standards for Better Food Security and Nutrition Decisions*. Rome. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Global Network Against Food Crises

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, which aims to enhance and coordinate the generation and dissemination of evidence-based information and analysis to prevent and address food crises.

In April 2026, GNAFC released the *2026 Global Report on Food Crises*. The report presents the number and share of the population analysed estimated to be facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 47 countries/territories affected by food crises in 2025, along with key drivers and trends.

The report is available at:

www.fightfoodcrises.net/global-report-food-crises

While the *Global Report on Food Crises* provides a retrospective, evidence-based overview of food crisis countries – reporting on the previous year’s food security situation and offering preliminary forecasts for the current year – the *Hunger Hotspots* report offers a complementary forward-looking, early warning analysis. It identifies countries and contexts where acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate over a six-month outlook period.



Upcoming trends in acute food insecurity drivers

Organized violence and conflict risks

During the outlook period, armed conflict and other forms of organized violence will remain primary drivers of acute food insecurity in **12 of the 13 hunger hotspots**, underscoring their central role in driving deteriorating conditions across many contexts. Conflict levels continue to rise in 2025: one in six people worldwide were exposed to armed violence and conflict levels have almost doubled compared with five years ago.²

Conflict induces acute food insecurity through multiple, interconnected channels. It drives large-scale displacement, disrupts agricultural production and damages critical infrastructure, while constraining market functioning and access to food.^{3,4} As of June 2025, 117.3 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced.⁵ These conflict-induced movements strain livelihoods, overwhelm host communities and deepen acute food insecurity. Compounding the crisis, humanitarian access constraints, funding shortfalls and restrictions on humanitarian operations are increasingly limiting the delivery of assistance. In the most severe contexts these dynamics are increasing the risk of Famine, particularly where conflict is protracted and coping capacities are exhausted.⁶ Looking ahead, conflict dynamics are unlikely to improve across most hunger hotspots and are expected to remain a dominant driver of acute food insecurity during the outlook period.

The **Sudan** continues to face one of the world's most acute food crises, with a risk of Famine identified in 14 areas under a reasonable worst-case scenario, and all the areas except one locality are expected to remain at risk of Famine during the harvest through January 2027.⁷ Conflict is expected to intensify and expand geographically, including continued violence in Greater Kordofan and Darfur and escalating clashes in Blue Nile State.⁸ Similarly, intensifying violence, increasingly constrained humanitarian access and rising internal displacement are likely to further exacerbate already extreme levels of acute food insecurity in **South Sudan**, with a risk of Famine persisting or newly identified in four counties from April to July 2026.⁹ In **Somalia**, conflict has displaced people internally and disrupted trade and agricultural activities,^{10,11} with political tensions in federal member states triggering localized clashes.^{12,13} Conflict and insecurity are additional factors that contributed to the risk of Famine in Burhakaba district through June 2026.¹⁴

Escalation of armed conflict continues to drive acute food insecurity in **Mali**, where an escalation of violence is likely to further deteriorate an already critical security situation. Violence has intensified and is expected to continue in the northern regions of **Nigeria**, driving displacement and constraining access to food.¹⁵ Violence is also expected to remain elevated in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, particularly in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, resulting in large-scale displacement, market collapse and extreme humanitarian access constraints.¹⁶

The escalation of violence in **Lebanon** is disrupting transport corridors and damaging critical infrastructure, creating severe humanitarian access constraints, particularly in the South and Nabatieh governorates,¹⁷ while also undermining livelihoods and local market functioning in conflict-affected areas.¹⁸ In **Palestine**, despite limited improvements, the situation remains fragile amid a low-intensity continuation of the conflict in the **Gaza Strip**, where the heavy damage to the agrifood system and persistent access and supply restrictions continue to exacerbate very high levels of vulnerability.^{19,20} In the **West Bank**, escalating violence, movement restrictions, demolitions of homes and displacement of civilian populations continue to undermine agricultural livelihoods, market access and food availability.²¹ Localized conflict in **Yemen** is likely to trigger additional displacement in a country ranked as the fifth largest displacement crisis globally,²² continue to damage infrastructure, restrict movements and disrupt market access, further constraining food availability and access across affected areas.²³

Since February 2026, escalating border tensions between Pakistan and **Afghanistan** have escalated into armed conflict, displacing over 115 000 people, especially in areas already facing high levels of acute food insecurity.²⁴ In **Myanmar**, conflict continues to drive acute food insecurity and is expected to persist as a key driver during the outlook period, with millions internally displaced and further displacement likely amid extreme humanitarian access constraints.²⁵ The expansion of gang violence into previously less-affected districts in **Haiti** is driving further displacement and severely constraining humanitarian access, agricultural production and livelihoods.²⁶

Global implications of the conflict in the Middle East for acute food insecurity²⁷

The ongoing conflict in the Middle East entails significant disruptions for global agrifood markets, with increasing risk of further deterioration in acute food insecurity across hunger hotspots and countries requiring monitoring, through rising food prices driven by higher fuel and fertilizer costs, supply chain disruptions and reduced household purchasing power.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the major trade routes for seaborne oil transportation, through which nearly one-quarter of global oil trade passes, along with substantial quantities of liquefied natural gas and fertilizers.²⁸ The Middle East conflict has disrupted shipping flows through the Strait of Hormuz, adversely affecting global supply chains for energy and fertilizers and contributing to a surge in input prices, with international average fuel prices increasing by 40 percent month-on-month in March 2026. Constraints on fertilizer exports from the Persian Gulf have increased fertilizer prices, with recent spikes in urea prices signalling tighter supply conditions and adding upward pressure on food prices.²⁹ Prolonged disruptions to maritime trade routes through the Strait of Hormuz could constrain food availability across the region.

Disruptions to shipping routes are increasing transport and insurance costs, resulting in delays and higher costs for humanitarian assistance amid reduced funding availability. In addition, a potential economic slowdown in the Middle East could reduce remittance inflows to vulnerable households across the subregion, as well as Asia and the Horn of Africa, further weakening their capacity to access essential food.³⁰

Countries and territories already facing high levels of acute food insecurity are highly exposed to the implications of the Middle East conflict, particularly through increases in food prices. In the Near East region, the Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, are particularly exposed due to limited domestic food production and persistent economic crises. Rising energy prices and higher transportation costs are expected to further elevate import costs and exert upward pressure on domestic food prices.³¹ In Yemen, fuel supply chains disruptions, increased transportation costs and damage to critical infrastructure have sharply reduced fuel availability works, contributing to localized shortages in some Government of Yemen (GoY)-controlled areas, increasing concerns regarding the reliability of fuel supplies nationwide.³²

Currency volatility and constrained foreign exchange availability are compounding the impact of higher prices, while conflicts and economic challenges continue to disrupt livelihoods and erode household purchasing power. Humanitarian funding cuts are further exacerbating vulnerabilities and impacting food assistance, particularly in the Sudan,^{33, 34} the Syrian Arab Republic³⁵ and Yemen.³⁶ These factors increase the risk of worsening acute food insecurity among vulnerable populations by limiting access to essential foods.^{37, 38}

Impacts are also materializing in Central Asia. The conflict is likely to further tighten food supplies and drive up prices in neighbouring countries, including Afghanistan, which rely on imports of commodities such as wheat flour, dairy products and fruits.³⁹ Food-importing countries are increasingly seeking alternative suppliers to meet domestic demand. This adjustment is occurring in the context of already elevated global food prices, increasing the risk of reduced access to food, particularly in vulnerable and food-aid-dependent countries.⁴⁰ Elsewhere, in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, rising fuel prices and supply chain disruptions are increasing the cost of staple foods, including rice, while higher fertilizer prices are likely to constrain the upcoming planting season.⁴¹ In Myanmar, this is particularly evident among conflict-affected populations. Reduced remittances from and exports towards Gulf countries could also negatively affect the national economies in the region.^{42, 43, 44}

Across Western and Eastern Africa, including in Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia, rising fuel, fertilizer and food import costs driven by the Middle East conflict are placing upward pressure on food prices. High import dependency, coupled with supply chain disruptions and elevated shipping costs, is driving food price inflation and eroding household purchasing power. Higher input costs risk constraining agricultural production, while delays in shipments, including humanitarian supplies, are likely to further limit food availability. Amid persistent economic challenges, these pressures are expected to sustain or worsen acute food insecurity across the subregions during the outlook period.^{45, 46, 47}

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the increase in fuel prices arising from the conflict and the resulting rise in transport fares, is likely to further strain economic activity and erode the purchasing power of the population in Haiti.^{48, 49}



Economic risks

A renewed phase of global economic stress, characterized by slower growth, inflationary risks and conflict-related shocks to energy, freight and fertilizer markets, is likely to intensify acute food insecurity across a number of countries in 2026.

The global economy in 2026 is operating under heightened uncertainty. The April 2026 *World Economic Outlook* of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects global growth at 3.1 percent in 2026 and 3.2 percent in 2027, below recent levels and well below pre-pandemic averages, as the conflict in the Middle East pushes up commodity prices, inflation expectations and financing costs.⁵⁰

At this rate, the World Bank notes that global growth is unlikely to be sufficient to reduce extreme poverty and create jobs where they are most needed. Growth prospects also remain uneven: nearly all advanced economies are expected to be richer in per capita terms than before the pandemic, while one in four developing countries, and more than one-third of low-income economies, will still be poorer than five years earlier in 2026.⁵¹

Pressures on food prices are likely to intensify again. International commodity quotations are rising since the beginning of 2026, even if the latest reading of the FAO Food Price Index – an international trade basket of cereals, vegetable oils, dairy, meat and sugar – averaged 130.8 points in May 2026, up 2.9 percent year on year and remaining broadly stable from its revised April level. Significant differences persist across commodities.⁵² Pass-through to domestic markets is uneven: the World Bank reports that retail food inflation exceeded 5 percent in half of low-income countries in the first quarter of 2026 and remained above overall inflation in 57.1 percent of countries with comparable data.^{53,54}

A key transmission channel of inflationary pressures is the recent shock to fuel, shipping and fertilizer markets. About 20 percent of global oil supplies and roughly one-third of global fertilizer trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, while urea prices surged by nearly 46 percent between February and March 2026.⁵⁵ At the same time, fiscal buffers remain constrained: the IMF reports global public debt at just under 94 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2025, while the World Bank estimates that low- and middle-income countries paid a record USD 415 billion in external-debt interest in 2024.^{56,57}

These global macroeconomic pressures are manifesting acutely across the hunger hotspots analysed in this report.

In **Asia, Afghanistan** continues to face weak macroeconomic conditions, reduced remittance opportunities and border-related trade disruptions that keep wheat, rice and cooking oil prices elevated, while higher fuel and fertilizer costs raise new risks for 2026 production.^{58,59,60} **Myanmar's** economy is being further strained by its dependence on imported fuel: the Middle East conflict has increased food basket costs by an estimated 19 percent between February and March 2026, on top of already severe pressure from the 2025 earthquake, labour shortages and power disruptions.^{61,62,63}

In **Eastern Africa, South Sudan's** weak currency keeps sorghum and maize prices in Juba near record levels despite improved 2025 production.^{64,65,66} **Somalia's** drought-driven production collapse and rising import costs, including of fuel, are pushing cereal prices sharply higher.^{67,68} In **Southern Africa**, inflation and supply-chain disruptions have kept maize flour above pre-conflict levels in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, with Middle East conflict-related fuel and input costs both lifting market prices and straining the underfunded humanitarian response in the displacement crisis.^{69,70}

In **Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti's** economy is forecast to contract for the eighth consecutive year in 2026, while a high food inflation rate (24 percent in February 2026) is compressing household purchasing power, further aggravated by lower remittances and higher fuel costs.^{71,72,73,74}

In the **Near East and North Africa**, overlapping conflict and macroeconomic shocks continue to intensify acute food insecurity. In the **Sudan**, conflict has driven a roughly 40 percent year-on-year depreciation of the Sudanese pound on the parallel market, while staple food prices remain extremely high.^{75,76,77} In **Palestine**, restrictions on inflows into the Gaza Strip and movement constraints in the West Bank are tightening supplies and collapsing purchasing power.^{78,79,80,81} **Yemen** continues to face rising staple prices driven by foreign-exchange shortages, additional taxation in Sana'a-based authority (SBA) areas and renewed currency depreciation.^{82,83,84} In **Lebanon**, conflict-driven transport disruption and higher fuel costs are feeding into food inflation, hitting displaced and refugee households hardest.^{85,86,87,88}

In **West Africa**, in **Nigeria**, increases in fertilizer and fuel prices, exacerbated by the Middle East conflict, are raising transportation costs and constraining agricultural production, likely sustaining upward pressure on food prices.⁸⁹ Macroeconomic pressures across the central Sahel, linked to spillover effects from the ongoing Middle East conflict, are expected to further exacerbate economic challenges in **Mali** during the outlook period.⁹⁰

Natural hazard risks

Global climate conditions are expected to shift during the June–November 2026 outlook period, with a likely transition to El Niño conditions. Forecasts indicate a high probability of development between May and July, with El Niño expected to strengthen towards the end of the year, increasing the likelihood of widespread climate anomalies and extreme weather events.^{91,92}

El Niño is expected to drive uneven rainfall patterns across regions. Drier-than-average conditions are more likely across western parts of the Sahel, while near to above-average rainfall is expected across parts of the Gulf of Guinea. In Eastern Africa, El Niño impacts vary geographically, with below-average rainfall typically observed in western and parts of central areas during June–September, while wetter-than-average conditions and increased flooding are expected between September and December.⁹³ In the Near East and Central Asia, a tendency towards wetter conditions could increase flood risks, while in Central America and the Caribbean, below-average rainfall is forecast in Haiti. Parts of South and Southeast Asia may also experience rainfall deficits, although with greater uncertainty, as conditions may vary across the region, with some areas facing increased rainfall and flood risks while others remain drier. As El Niño is expected to strengthen towards the end of the year, associated rainfall anomalies may coincide with key stages of the agricultural season, with dry spells and drought conditions in southern Africa and parts of the Pacific, and above-average rainfall and flooding in eastern Africa and parts of the Near East and Central Asia, potentially disrupting the onset and progression of the growing season.⁹⁴

In **Eastern Africa**, consecutive seasons of below-average rainfall have been the main drivers of acute food insecurity. In **Somalia**, repeated poor rainy seasons have led to significant crop losses, depleted pasture and water resources and large-scale displacement, with impacts compounding over time.⁹⁵ In **South Sudan**, although conditions vary across the country, shifts in rainfall patterns are also affecting typical seasonal dynamics, potentially reducing flooding in some flood-prone areas while leading to localized moisture deficits in others.^{96,97} While rainfall conditions may show localized improvements during the outlook period, particularly in parts of the eastern Horn of Africa, the cumulative impact of successive droughts is likely to continue limiting recovery and sustaining high levels of vulnerability. The potential return of above average rainfall in late 2026, could also increase localized flood risks.

In **Southern Africa**, dry conditions and recurrent dry spells remain the main concern. In **Madagascar**, an irregular 2025/26 rainy season, marked by uneven rainfall and prolonged

dry periods, along with the impacts of successive tropical cyclones, has already affected crop development and reduced yield expectations.⁹⁸ In parts of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, mixed rainfall conditions are expected during the outlook period, with localized dry spells and flood events potentially compounding existing disruptions to agricultural activities and livelihoods.⁹⁹ As the region enters its dry season, attention shifts to the next rains from October, with early signals pointing to an increased likelihood of reduced rainfall, which could prolong existing moisture deficits.¹⁰⁰

In **West Africa and the Sahel**, the climate outlook points to contrasting conditions across subregions. In parts of the central Sahel, including western and central **Mali**, below-average rainfall is likely during the early part of the rainy season, consistent with emerging El Niño conditions, potentially resulting in a weaker seasonal performance.¹⁰¹ In **Nigeria**, rainfall conditions are expected to be more mixed, with below-average rainfall more likely in southern and coastal areas, while northern areas may experience periods of above-average rainfall and associated flood risks.¹⁰²


In **Central America and the Caribbean**, below-average rainfall is expected across the rainy season in **Haiti**, potentially affecting seasonal agricultural activities. At the same time, the ongoing transition towards El Niño is likely to reduce the frequency of tropical cyclones during the season, lowering the risk of storm-related impacts while also reflecting a tendency towards drier conditions.^{103,104}

In the **Near East**, recurrent dry conditions and above-average temperatures are expected to continue in some countries – despite the possibility of localized flood events – during the outlook period, while conflict remains the primary driver of acute food insecurity, and climatic conditions continue to shape outcomes in some countries.¹⁰⁵ In the **Sudan**, there is also a risk that below-average rainfall during the season could further constrain agricultural production, particularly in key agricultural areas in central and eastern parts of the country.¹⁰⁶ In **Yemen**, below-average rainfall is expected in eastern and southern areas during the outlook period, alongside a risk of flooding in parts of western and coastal areas, which may further constrain already fragile agricultural conditions.¹⁰⁷

In **Asia and the Pacific**, climatic stress continues to compound vulnerabilities, particularly in Central Asia. In **Afghanistan**, consecutive drought conditions, below-average snowpack and above-average temperatures have already reduced water availability and are likely to constrain agricultural conditions during the 2026 cropping season.¹⁰⁸ Elsewhere in the region, rainfall variability and extremes, including flooding and dry conditions, remain a concern in **Myanmar**.

Number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

Most recent available data for 2026, in millions¹



- IPC/CH Phase 3 or equivalent
- IPC/CH Phase 4 or equivalent
- IPC/CH Phase 5 or equivalent

NOTES

- 1 The data presented reflect the most recent projections available and are from 2025 and 2026.
- 2 The CH projection for June–August 2026 referenced in this report is based on the projection released in October 2025. After the cut-off date of this report, an updated June–August 2026 CH projection was released. The projection indicates that 36.3 million people will likely face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the 27 states and the Federal Capital Territory through August 2026 – representing nearly 17 percent of the population analysed – including 2.1 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) located in the northeast and northwest, and over 10 000 people in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno state.
- 3 Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 15.
- 4 The figures reported in this chart for Yemen are based on the June 2025 IPC analysis and take into account the updated national population figure of 35.2 million people as per the HNRP 2026 published in March 2026.
- 5 Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 18.
- 6 Data for 2026 are from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar HNRP 2026.
- 7 Most current data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 18.
- 8 Data cover only South, Southeast, East and Northeast regions and Antananarivo.
- 9 Rafah Governorate was not analysed due to a lack of data and indications that it is largely depopulated.
- 10 Prevalence is expressed as a percentage of the population analysed.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en

Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to November 2026)*. Rome.

Note: During the IPC analysis published in June 2025, the Yemen country population was estimated at 34.8 million people. While the HNRP 2026 published in March 2026 considers the IPC analysis for establishing the number of people in need of Food Security and Agriculture assistance, it also takes into account the updated national population figure of 35.2 million people. Therefore, while the percentage of the population estimated to face acute food insecurity remain the same in the IPC published in June 2025 and in the HNRP 2026 published in March 2026, the number of people estimated in IPC Phase 3 or above differs slightly because of the updated population base numbers.

Reduction of humanitarian assistance

Humanitarian assistance to food sectors in crisis contexts plummeted in 2025, dropping by an estimated 59 percent since 2022, even as global acute food insecurity remains persistently high, affecting 22.9 percent of the population analysed, or around 266 million people.¹⁰⁹ Funding has fallen back to levels last seen in 2016–2017, while the share of the population analysed facing high acute food insecurity has doubled since then. This reflects major funding cuts in official development assistance,¹¹⁰ with further declines of 5.8 percent projected in 2026.¹¹¹

Severe funding reductions have significantly constrained humanitarian response capacity and forced increasingly stringent prioritization. In 2025, the humanitarian community was compelled to narrow assistance to 114 million people out of 178 million initially targeted, ultimately reaching nearly 98 million people – around 25 million fewer than in 2024.¹¹² In 2026, this contraction has led to an even more sharply prioritised response. Humanitarian partners aim to assist 135 million people globally, with immediate life-saving assistance prioritized for 87 million people most at risk, reflecting difficult trade-offs amid sustained funding shortfalls. As of June 2026, only around one third of the requirements – or 33 percent – have been met, severely constraining the scale and ambition of humanitarian action.^{113, 114}

Cuts in humanitarian assistance for food-security sectors were highly concentrated in some of the most severe and largest food crises. In 2025, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen accounted for 44 percent of the global reduction in humanitarian assistance to food sectors in crisis context (USD 2 billion of USD 4.5 billion). These same countries recorded a combined increase of approximately 6 million people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) in 2025, underscoring a troubling convergence between rising needs and declining resources.¹¹⁵ In Mali, humanitarian assistance for food-security sectors shrank by 52 percent between 2024 and 2025 despite a deterioration in acute food insecurity. In the Syrian Arab Republic, despite persistent and widespread acute food insecurity, the humanitarian assistance for food-security sectors decreased by 66 percent in 2024 – from USD 1.3 billion in 2023 to USD 437 million in 2024 – and by a further 18 percent in 2025.^{116, 117}

Cuts to assessments, monitoring and analytical capacity are weakening the evidence base for food security monitoring, prioritization of assistance and operational decision-making, particularly in underfunded, high-risk contexts.^{118, 119, 120, 121} In 2025, key data providers scaled back substantially: WFP survey interviews fell by 30 percent,¹²² and FAO Data in

Emergencies (DIEM) collection by about 31 percent,¹²³ with further cuts expected in 2026. Several IPC/CH analyses have shifted from biannual to annual cycles, and population coverage declined across multiple countries, limiting trend comparability and introducing bias.

Reduced funding also constrains the availability of disaggregated data, despite evidence that forcibly displaced populations consistently experience higher levels of acute food insecurity than resident populations,¹²⁴ undermining efforts to accurately capture needs, anticipate deterioration and support effective responses in displacement settings. Funding gaps are already aggravating acute food insecurity and malnutrition, with particularly severe consequences for women, children, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). With assistance to forcibly displaced populations reduced,¹²⁵ they are left more exposed to acute food insecurity and, in some cases, are forced to move elsewhere or return to countries of origin despite fragile conditions. WFP estimates that refugee outflows increase by 1.9 percent for each percentage increase in acute food insecurity.¹²⁶

Examples of the consequences of funding cuts include rising acute malnutrition in Afghanistan, reduced protection support and food assistance for displaced people in Haiti, and growing risks to life-saving assistance in South Sudan, where access is extremely costly. Preparedness has also weakened, including reduced contingency stocks in Haiti, and these impacts are expected to continue and likely worsen in 2026.¹²⁷ In the Syrian Arab Republic, WFP anticipates the emergency food assistance will be reduced by half in 2026 due to funding shortages.¹²⁸ Modelled projections suggest that a severe reduction in humanitarian financing could be associated with up to 22.6 million additional deaths globally by 2030, including 5.4 million children under 5 years of age.^{129, 130}

Humanitarian financing alone cannot offset the political drivers of conflict and climate-related risk. Ongoing violations of international humanitarian law highlight the need for stronger political action to prevent conflict, ensure accountability and protect humanitarian access. Without this, needs will continue to exceed available resources.¹³¹

In this constrained context, stronger collaboration with development actors is essential to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources and avoid fragmented responses.¹³² Enhanced coordination is essential to address underlying drivers of food insecurity, while resilience-building interventions remain vital for populations heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance and most vulnerable to funding reductions.¹³³

Early warning systems and anticipatory action for preventing Famine

In Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5), populations face an extreme lack of food and are unable to meet their basic needs; starvation and death are widespread. In this phase, livelihoods have collapsed, lives and futures have been lost, and social safety nets and community networks have been severely disrupted. Although further deaths can and should be prevented by urgent action, these actions will be a late response, as many would have died by this point.¹³⁴

Modern famines are almost always human-made,¹³⁵ foreseeable and preventable.^{136, 137}

Famines typically occur in contexts characterized by conflict, extreme vulnerability, poverty, the breakdown of governance and institutions, and marginalization, where livelihoods and coping strategies have been exhausted and access to basic services has progressively deteriorated. Constraints on humanitarian access are a critical contributing factor. Insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and physical isolation continue to obstruct the delivery of assistance in many settings. At the same time, global humanitarian funding is declining, creating significant operational gaps that are forcing reductions in food rations and limiting the scale and reach of life-saving interventions.^{138, 139, 140}

Greater coherence in political commitments, funding allocations and interventions along the humanitarian–development–peace nexus is needed. This includes acting

early when signs of acute food insecurity and malnutrition appear, supporting livelihoods and improving access to essential services, rather than relying on food assistance alone.

While Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) reflects a situation in which widespread deaths and acute malnutrition are occurring, people may face Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) – meaning extreme lack of food, exhaustion of coping capacities, starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death – but the area may not be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) if widespread deaths and acute malnutrition have not yet occurred in the area.¹⁴¹

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) represents an extremely severe situation where urgent assistance is needed to save lives and livelihoods. People in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) are already experiencing rising acute malnutrition, while those in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) face increasing mortality, clear signs that the crisis is well under way.¹⁴² Timely intervention at these stages is not only life-saving but also cost-effective, reducing the need for expensive emergency responses later. Decision-makers must act before conditions deteriorate further, scaling up food, nutrition and livelihoods assistance as soon as early-warning signs appear. Waiting until Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) is declared before intervening represents a failure of foresight; by then, it is too late for many.¹⁴³





Hunger hotspots of highest concern

In the **Sudan**, during the June–September 2026 period, a risk of Famine has been identified in 14 areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan states under a reasonable worst-case scenario, characterized by intensified conflict and further restrictions on humanitarian access and the movement of goods and people.¹⁴⁴ All areas except Beliel locality are expected to remain at risk of Famine through January 2027. Multifront fighting is likely to expand, with continued violence in Greater Kordofan and Darfur,¹⁴⁵ increased drone use¹⁴⁶ and escalating clashes in Blue Nile State.¹⁴⁷ Displacement levels are expected to remain elevated despite a 22 percent decline from peak levels, driven by the return of nearly 4 million people,¹⁴⁸ and the economic crisis is expected to persist,¹⁴⁹ while disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict are likely to further increase food inflation.¹⁵⁰ Cereal production in 2025 was estimated at below-average levels.¹⁵¹ Around 19.5 million people (41 percent of the population) were estimated to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) through May 2026, including 5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In June–September 2026, the population projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is estimated at 200 000 people across 15 areas, a sharp increase from 135 000 in February–May 2026.¹⁵² A nationwide projection analysis was not possible due to data gaps; however, numbers are likely to rise during the outlook period as the lean season peaks in August and September and amid funding cuts.¹⁵³

In **South Sudan**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain extremely severe in several counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile states, driven by conflict. Between April and July 2026, 7.8 million people (55 percent of the population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁵⁴ According to the latest IPC analysis, approximately 73 000 people are projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) by July 2026, in Akobo, Fangak, Luakpiny/Nasir, Nyirol, Ulang and Uror counties of Jonglei and Upper Nile state. In a plausible worst-case scenario marked by renewed escalation of conflict, further displacement and reduced access, there is a credible risk of Famine in Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang, Akobo and Nyirol counties.¹⁵⁵ Acute malnutrition remains extremely concerning and continues to deteriorate, with an estimated 2.2 million children aged 6–59 months affected, representing approximately 90 000 additional cases requiring treatment, including around 697 000 cases of severe acute malnutrition.¹⁵⁶ Intensifying clashes are expected to continue displacing households, adding to the existing population of over 2.5 million IDPs.¹⁵⁷ The continued influx of returnees and refugees from the Sudan is intensifying pressure on scarce resources in host communities,¹⁵⁸ while extreme humanitarian access constraints,¹⁵⁹ combined with a weak South Sudanese pound and high inflation, heighten the risk of worsening acute food insecurity.¹⁶⁰




Trends in high acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots of highest concern

2020–2026¹ peak numbers and prevalence

■ Number of people in IPC/CH 3+ or equivalent (in millions)

○ Prevalence IPC/CH 3+ or equivalent in the population analysed



NOTES

- 1 Data for 2026 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of May 2026.
- 2 For the Sudan, no peak data are available for the expected peak period in 2026. Although a country-wide analysis covering the period February to May 2026 is available, it covers the post-harvest period and may not reflect the peak in needs amid protracted conflict, which is likely to occur in June–September 2026 during the lean season.
- 3 Data for 2020–2022 and 2025–2026 come from IPC; data for 2023 come from FEWS NET and correspond to the upper-bound of a range; data for 2024 come from IPC and Food Security Cluster. Comparability is limited. 2025 and 2026 peak data come from the same analysis. The 2025–2026 figures reported in this chart take into account the updated national population figure of 35.2 million people as per the HNRP 2026 published in March 2026.
- 4 Geographical coverage increased from 16 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2020 to 27 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2026; therefore, comparability is limited. The CH figures covering June–August 2026 referenced in this report are based on the projection released in October 2025. After the cut-off date of this report, an updated June–August 2026 CH projection was released. The projection indicates that 36.3 million people will likely face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the 27 states and the Federal Capital Territory through August 2026, representing nearly 17 percent of the population analysed.
- 5 Data for 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 come from IPC analyses. Data for 2022 are from HNOs while data from 2020–2021 are based on the SEFSec methodology with acute food insecurity prevalence referring to households as opposed to individuals. These sources apply different methodologies which limits comparability. The 2020 and 2021 figures refer to the same analysis (SEFSec 2020 published in 2021), therefore, the 2020 estimate does not align with the source used in the Global Report on Food Crises. In 2025, given the inability to classify North Gaza, the numbers above are an underestimate and only include the populations analysed and classified in Gaza, Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis governorates and exclude any remaining population in Rafah as it is largely uninhabited.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend however comparability issues exist in terms of:

(i) Nigeria: population coverage varied from 47 percent in 2020, to 73 percent in 2021, 91 percent in 2023, 89 percent in 2025 and 79 percent in 2026; Palestine (Gaza Strip): population coverage varied from 100 percent in 2020–2024 to 94 percent in 2025 and 99 percent in 2026.

(ii) Analysis time periods differ for Nigeria, Palestine (Gaza Strip), Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.

Source: FAO and WFP. 2026. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (June to November 2026)*. Rome.

In **Yemen**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain among the most severe globally,¹⁶¹ driven by high food prices, ongoing internal and regional conflict, and climate shocks, including floods and dry conditions, compounded by severe humanitarian funding shortfalls and critical operational space constraints, leading to a drastic contraction of humanitarian assistance coverage.¹⁶² Rising staple food prices in both GoY- and SBA-controlled areas, driven by increased import costs and foreign currency shortfalls, are limiting household purchasing power.¹⁶³ The ongoing conflict in the Middle East is expected to exacerbate volatility, disrupt supply chains and further deteriorate livelihoods.¹⁶⁴ Between September 2025 and February 2026, an estimated 18.3 million people nationwide were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity, including about 12.8 million in SBA-controlled areas and 5.5 million in GoY-controlled areas. Among them, 5.5 million were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 41 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{165, 166, 167} According to the latest partial analysis published in May 2026, nearly 5.4 million people in GoY-controlled areas were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity between June and September 2026, including 1.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to persist at around 5.4 million during October–December 2026 in GoY-controlled areas. However, severity is projected to worsen, with a 9 percent increase to 1.8 million people in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).¹⁶⁸

Acute food insecurity in **Nigeria** is expected to further deteriorate due to conflict, worsening macroeconomic conditions amplified by the Middle East conflict and climate shocks. Insecurity remains high in the North East, North West and North Central regions, with incidents and fatalities increasing.¹⁶⁹ Conflict could create a compounding risk for the June–August lean season and beyond.¹⁷⁰ Rising fuel and fertilizer prices are likely to increase transportation costs and constrain agricultural production, likely sustaining upward pressure on food prices.¹⁷¹ Around 34.8 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) during June–August 2026, including about 1.8 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) and over 15 000 in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno State.^{172, 173}

In the **Gaza Strip**, acute food insecurity has improved since the October 2025 ceasefire, although conditions remain fragile amid the continued low-intensity conflict.¹⁷⁴ At the same time, restrictions on humanitarian and commercial inflows continue to severely limit the availability of essential inputs and hinder the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and the recovery of



livelihoods. In the latest IPC analysis from December 2025, 1.6 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity in the Gaza Strip between December 2025 and mid-April 2026, of whom nearly 571 000 people were expected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 1 900 people were expected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). The entire Gaza Strip was at risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario during this period.¹⁷⁵ In the **West Bank**, escalating violence, movement restrictions, demolitions of homes and displacement of civilian populations continue to undermine agricultural livelihoods, market access and food availability.¹⁷⁶

Somalia is facing critical levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition due to drought, conflict, displacement and rising food prices, with Burhakaba District at risk of Famine under a plausible worst-case scenario.¹⁷⁷ From April to June 2026, around 6 million people (31 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, including nearly 1.9 million people projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁷⁸ Consecutive poor rainy seasons, including the failed October–December 2025 *Deyr*,^{179, 180} and a poor start to the 2026 *Gu*,¹⁸¹ are straining livelihoods, driving displacement and constraining food availability. Combined with rising fuel and transport costs and the rejection of the Somali shilling by traders in southern areas, this is pushing food prices higher.¹⁸² El Niño conditions may support recovery from drought between October and December, while also increasing flood risks.¹⁸³ Conflict will remain a key driver, disrupting trade and agricultural activities and driving displacement, while political tensions continue to trigger localized armed clashes.¹⁸⁴

Hunger hotspots of very high concern

In the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, acute food insecurity is expected to persist, driven by the conflict in eastern provinces and related large-scale displacement and extreme access constraints. As of February 2026, about 6.5 million people were internally displaced, amid market disruptions, disease outbreaks and critically underfunded assistance. Between January and June 2026, over 3.6 million people were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4), expanding to additional territories in North Kivu, South Kivu and Tanganyika.¹⁸⁵ The Ebola outbreak reported in May in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces poses an additional risk to livelihoods, and may further aggravate acute food insecurity by disrupting markets, mobility and humanitarian access.¹⁸⁶


In **Afghanistan**, acute food insecurity is expected to remain high, driven by dry conditions, economic stress and escalating conflict. Below-average snowpack and above-average temperatures accelerating snowmelt are likely to reduce wheat production and affect pasture conditions.¹⁸⁷
^{188, 189} The conflict with Pakistan has displaced more than 115 000 people and disrupted trade and humanitarian

assistance delivery, increasing production costs.^{190, 191} Weak macroeconomic conditions, returnee inflows and funding shortfalls are expected to further worsen acute food insecurity.¹⁹² From April to September 2026, 2.9 million people (6 percent of the population) are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.¹⁹³

In **Haiti**, elevated levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist due to expanding gang violence driving further internal displacement, which was already at record highs in December 2025.¹⁹⁴ Insecurity continues to constrain access to land, markets and livelihood opportunities, while increasing the risk of violence linked to the political transition, including elections currently planned for August 2026.¹⁹⁵ The persistent economic crisis,¹⁹⁶ additional pressure on fuel and fertilizer prices due to the Middle East conflict and below-average rainfall forecast during the outlook period¹⁹⁷ will further undermine food availability and access. Between March and June 2026, about 1.8 million people (16 percent of the population) are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4).¹⁹⁸

Trends in high acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots of very high concern

2020–2026¹ peak numbers and prevalence



NOTES

1 Data for 2026 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of May 2026.

2 Geographical coverage increased from 85 territories and 18 urban areas in 2020 to 145 territories and 41 urban areas in 2025; therefore, comparability is limited.

3 The peak data for 2022 and 2023, and for 2025 and 2026, refer to the same analysis. The 2020 figures have been updated to reflect the Flowminder population figures in the Afghanistan IPC analysis, consistent with the approach used in the Global Report on Food Crises.

Comparisons over time indicate a general trend; however, comparability issues exist. In Haiti, IPC analyses covered 87–93 percent of the population in 2020–2023, compared with 100 percent in 2024–2026. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, coverage ranged from 65 percent of the population in 2020 to 91–99 percent in 2022–2026. Analysis periods also differ between the two countries.

Caution should be exercised when interpreting and using this analysis. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.



Other situations that require monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots, are assessed to merit close monitoring. These include:

- Situations where data are insufficient or unavailable to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied quantitative methodology, but where a qualitative assessment of available evidence on acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition, conflict, displacement, climatic hazards, economic conditions, disease outbreaks and humanitarian-access constraints indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity during the outlook period, as determined by consensus during the regional selection meetings.
- Situations where recent acute food insecurity information is available, and where acute food insecurity is expected to persist or deteriorate during the outlook period. Although the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks indicates a lower level of concern than in countries, territories and situations selected as hunger hotspots, these situations warrant close monitoring.

Pakistan (selected areas)

Acute food insecurity remains concerning across **Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab** and **Khyber Pakhtunkhwa**,¹⁹⁹ driven by lingering 2025 flood impacts, forecast dry conditions and conflict. Wheat flour prices surged by 28 percent year-on-year by April 2026,²⁰⁰ amid 7.6 percent annual food inflation, eroding purchasing power.^{201, 202} The Middle East conflict is likely to strain food access,²⁰³ further weakening the 2026 economic growth outlook despite financial support from the IMF.²⁰⁴

Between April and September 2026 – May to November 2026 for Punjab – 9.2 million people (17 percent of the rural population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including over 570 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²⁰⁵ Acute malnutrition remains high across 45 rural districts of Balochistan, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, affecting over 2.7 million children and 232 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women.²⁰⁶

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

Of the Rohingya population, estimated at 1.2 million as of end-February 2026,²⁰⁷ nearly 446 000 Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar and Bhashan Char (40 percent of the population

analysed) faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity from May to December 2025, including 223 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).²⁰⁸ Conflict in Myanmar's Rakhine State is likely to prompt further displacement of civilians and inflows of refugees into Bangladesh, with over 146 000 new arrivals recorded since 2024.²⁰⁹ Additionally, funding uncertainties and inflationary pressures could further undermine the food security and nutrition situation of Rohingya families, who are heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance.^{210, 211}

Ethiopia

Though 2026 acute food insecurity estimates are unavailable, outcomes are expected to be mixed, with seasonal deteriorations during the June–September peak hunger period in Meher-receiving areas, when household food stocks are depleted and reliance on markets is highest, followed by some improvement during the October harvest period. Poor October–December 2025 rains in southeastern pastoral areas²¹² reduced rangeland resources, affected livestock body conditions and drove negative coping strategies among pastoralists.²¹³ Recovery is expected to take time despite improved March–May rains in many but not all areas.²¹⁴ El Niño conditions may reduce June–September 2026 rains in Meher-receiving areas, while bringing above-average October–December rains in the southeast, compounding existing vulnerabilities beyond the outlook period.^{215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221}

At the same time, violence in areas such as the Amhara, Tigray and Somali regions continues to disrupt markets, increase food prices and constrain food access.²²² Ongoing insecurity may be further influenced by pre- and post-election dynamics, potentially resulting in localized tensions, displacement and trade disruptions. Elevated food inflation continues to erode purchasing power, while sustained fuel and transport costs may further constrain market access and disrupt supply chains.^{223, 224}

Cuba

Despite data limitations, the food security and nutrition situation in **Cuba** is at risk of deterioration during the outlook period, driven by long-standing structural challenges and external pressures.^{225, 226, 227} A prolonged economic contraction,²²⁸ declining domestic food production,²²⁹ limited fiscal space, a severe energy crisis linked to fuel import restrictions, and the impacts of Hurricane Melissa in late

2025,²³⁰ have significantly undermined food availability, access and consumption. Fuel shortages²³¹ and recurrent nationwide power grid collapses are acting as a system-wide shock, disrupting agricultural production, food imports and access to basic services, while accelerating food price inflation and further eroding fragile livelihoods.²³²

Dry Corridor of Central America

A significant number of people across Central America are facing acute food insecurity, including about 3 million people in Guatemala who were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 248 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between February and April 2026, while in Honduras 1.6 million people faced Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 62 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), between August and November 2025.^{233, 234, 235} Concerns are particularly high in the Dry Corridor, where recurrent droughts and reliance on rainfed agriculture increase vulnerability. There is an emerging risk of below-average rainfall during the *primera* season (May–August), linked to a likely transition towards El Niño conditions,²³⁶ which could reduce planting area and yields of key staples such as maize and beans, with potential effects on the subsequent *postrera* season (October–December) planting. In rainfed areas, reduced production may accelerate stock depletion and increase market reliance, further constraining food access amid rising input and transport costs.²³⁷

Islamic Republic of Iran

Despite the lack of acute food insecurity data for Iranian nationals, elevated food inflation, coupled with large-scale population displacements,²³⁸ critical infrastructure damage and the economic contraction resulting from the conflict,²³⁹ increase the risk of deterioration. Before the conflict, food

inflation exceeded 40 percent year-on-year,²⁴⁰ and in April 2026, the cost of WFP's food basket was about 137 percent higher compared with April 2025.²⁴¹ Increased agricultural production costs are likely to result in a contraction in the planted area for wheat,²⁴² and prolonged disruptions to shipments through the Strait of Hormuz could affect supply chains and production, given the Islamic Republic of Iran's reliance on imports of key food and feed commodities.²⁴³ The estimated 4.4 million refugees and people in need of international protection, mostly Afghan nationals, are among the most vulnerable.²⁴⁴

Syrian Arab Republic

Acute food insecurity remains widespread, with approximately 7.2 million people facing acute food insecurity as of end-2025, despite recent improvements in food availability and prices.^{245, 246} Consecutive yearly droughts and mixed early-season rainfall have already constrained agricultural production and are expected to keep production below average in 2026, with mixed crop conditions across regions reflecting earlier rainfall deficits and delayed crop development, limiting food access amid still high prices, weak purchasing power, significant dependence on food imports amid major global trade disruptions that are increasing the risk of higher global food prices and further displacement.^{247, 248, 249} Over 1.5 million Syrian refugees have voluntarily returned to the Syrian Arab Republic since late 2024,²⁵⁰ increasing pressure on markets, services and livelihoods.²⁵¹ The acute food insecurity situation is expected to be compounded by significant reductions in humanitarian assistance in 2026.²⁵²

Angola

Despite a lack of updated data, acute food insecurity is likely to remain elevated, particularly in the south and west, where consecutive years of drought have constrained localized food availability. Rainfall deficits in central provinces – the country's main cereal-producing regions – and eastern areas during the 2025/26 cropping season are expected to result in reduced agricultural output, with cereal crops normally harvested between April and June.^{253, 254} The cumulative effects of consecutive droughts have weakened livelihoods and coping capacities, and recovery is expected to remain slow, as forecasts point to a risk of a delayed onset of the next rainy season linked to El Niño conditions in southern and western areas.^{255, 256}

Burkina Faso

In Burkina Faso, although no updated CH analysis is currently available, the food security situation remains concerning amid the continued expansion of insecurity across the central Sahel.²⁵⁷ Persistent violence continues to limit access to agricultural land and affects trade flows and markets,



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particularly in conflict-affected northern and eastern regions, while large-scale displacement and continued humanitarian access constraints further heighten vulnerability.^{258, 259} Although the gradual improvement in the security situation in some areas has enabled some displaced populations to return to their areas of origin, returnees continue to face significant challenges related to resettlement, access to productive resources and the resumption of livelihoods.²⁶⁰ Middle East conflict-related trade disruptions could raise the cost of imported fuel, fertilizers and food products, negatively affecting household purchasing power, access to agricultural inputs and agricultural production in 2026.^{261, 262}

Cameroon (selected areas)

Despite the reduction in violence, insecurity in the **Far North, North-West and South-West** continues to restrict food access and has displaced over 1 million IDPs and over 500 000 refugees.²⁶³ Food prices rose during the lean season due to poor harvests and are expected to increase further due to forecast flooding-related disruptions.^{264, 265} In the **Far North, North-West and South-West** areas, 1.9 million people (18 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above), including 228 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁶⁶

Chad

Nearly 3 million people (16 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2026, including 264 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁶⁷ Sustained inflows of refugees and returnees from the Sudan are expected to increase humanitarian needs in eastern provinces^{268, 269, 270} and place added pressure on local resources.²⁷¹ In Lac Province, insecurity is likely to continue to erode the livelihoods of IDPs and host households. Nationwide, rising transport and imported food costs due to the Middle East conflict may worsen food access, while limited access to fertilizers may negatively affect crop production.²⁷² These risks are compounded by climate-related uncertainty during the May–October rainfall season.²⁷³

Guinea

According to the latest CH analysis, about 1.7 million people (13 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity between June and August 2026, including 91 700 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁷⁴ However, the analysis was based on November 2025 crop production forecasts that were significantly higher than the March 2026 estimates, which indicate a sharp decline in output.²⁷⁵ Figures for 2023/24, and partly for 2024/25, are estimate-based, whereas 2025/26 data

are derived from a comprehensive Agricultural Integrated Survey (EAI/ANASA). This methodological shift may partly influence the observed declines, which should therefore be interpreted in light of both actual shocks and data-related effects. These production shortfalls, together with Middle East conflict-related market disruptions and a weak currency,²⁷⁶ are likely to increase import costs and food inflation. Furthermore, economic challenges and below-average rainfall could further constrain agricultural production in 2026.²⁷⁷

Niger

Acute food insecurity remains concerning in the Niger, with approximately 2.4 million people projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2026 lean season, including around 19 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁷⁸ Continued insecurity in Tillabéry, Diffa, Tahoua and Dosso regions is driving displacement and disrupting livelihoods, food production and market access. Conflict incidents in Tillabéry region continue to affect local communities and agricultural households, contributing to rising displacement, while the Niger hosted more than 1 million forcibly displaced people as of 30 April 2026, including over 548 000 IDPs.^{279, 280} Macroeconomic pressures linked to the ongoing Middle East crisis are meanwhile expected to raise fuel, transport and fertilizer prices, potentially reducing cultivated areas and further affecting agricultural production and household incomes.²⁸¹

Sierra Leone

Acute food insecurity will remain a concern, with over 1.3 million people (15 percent of the population) projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2026, including nearly 135 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).²⁸² Low purchasing power will continue to limit access to food, and rising global tensions and higher fuel prices are expected to increase agricultural production costs. Furthermore, climate shocks led to localized shortfalls in agricultural production in 2025, aggravating acute food insecurity among vulnerable households, while forecasts of below-average rainfall between April and June are likely to affect the planting of 2026 crops.²⁸³

Country risk narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: consecutive drought, economic stress, conflict

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain high, driven by dry conditions, economic stress, including high food prices and escalating conflict, while funding shortfalls constrain the scale and coverage of food and emergency agriculture assistance, exacerbating vulnerabilities amid very high access constraints.

Due to consecutive droughts, the 2026 winter wheat production is forecast to be below average in rainfed northern areas, the central highlands and the southwest, where livestock body conditions are below average due to limited fodder availability following poor pasture conditions in 2025.^{284, 285} Dry conditions in April–May 2026, below-average snowpack and above-average temperatures accelerating snowmelt, are expected to result in wheat production shortfalls, reduced water availability and deteriorating pasture conditions.^{286, 287, 288}

As of April 2026, wheat prices were up to 20 percent above 2025 levels, while rice and cooking oil prices remained elevated due to high transport costs and reduced informal trade following border closures with Pakistan since September 2025.²⁸⁹ The escalation of border tensions into armed conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan since February 2026 has disrupted trade and humanitarian assistance delivery, displaced more than 115 000 people²⁹⁰ and increased input prices, raising production costs and concerns about agricultural production in 2026.²⁹¹

Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain weak during the outlook period due to limited labour opportunities, returnee inflows, conflict-related shocks and reduced remittance flows. Since late 2023, about 5.7 million Afghans returned from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, with further inflows possible, adding pressure on limited resources and labour opportunities.²⁹² Humanitarian funding shortfalls significantly constrain assistance delivery, with sharply reduced coverage. Acute malnutrition remains critically high in many provinces and is expected to worsen during the outlook

period, affecting millions of pregnant and breastfeeding women and children under 5 years of age.^{293, 294, 295}

From April to September 2026, 13.8 million people (28 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), a significant deterioration compared with May–October 2025.^{296, 297}



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RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Afghanistan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 651 million for food security and agriculture interventions and USD 298 million for nutrition interventions.²⁹⁸

- Scale up and sustain nutrition-sensitive, life-saving general food assistance, in view of the rapidly deteriorating malnutrition situation and the heightened risk of child mortality.
- Implement integrated cash+ emergency agriculture packages to vulnerable populations, prioritizing wheat cultivation, livestock protection and backyard vegetable production to bridge seasonal food gaps and preserve productive assets.

- Implement rapid agricultural response mechanisms and control measures for plant pests and animal diseases, such as locust infestations and lumpy skin disease, integrated with proactive early-warning systems.

Other actions

- Deliver an integrated package of preventive and curative services that prioritizes provinces with IPC Acute Malnutrition (AMN) Phase 3 and 4, targeting children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women in priority provinces through blanket supplementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation and community-based early detection.



Asia and the Pacific

Myanmar

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic challenges, flooding

The combined effects of conflict and economic challenges, compounded by extreme humanitarian access constraints and funding shortfalls, are expected to continue driving high levels of acute food insecurity across the country and critical levels of acute malnutrition in selected townships.

Conflict remains a key driver of humanitarian needs in Myanmar,²⁹⁹ with households in affected areas facing heightened levels of acute food insecurity due to displacement, access restrictions and market disruptions. As of March 2026, 3.7 million people were internally displaced, and over 286 000 had fled the country since early 2021, mostly to Bangladesh.³⁰⁰ Internal displacement is projected to rise to 4 million by the end of 2026.³⁰¹

Humanitarian access constraints in Myanmar remain extreme³⁰² and, coupled with significant underfunding, leave many essential needs unmet.^{303, 304} There is a significant risk that funding gaps could force severe disruptions in humanitarian assistance during the outlook period, including the suspension of food assistance to populations facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity.

The outlook is compounded by heightened flood risks from July to September³⁰⁵ and the economic impact of the Middle East conflict due to Myanmar's high reliance on fuel imports.³⁰⁶ Rising fertilizer and fuel costs and shortages are expected to negatively affect 2026 agricultural production, farmers' incomes and exert upward pressure on already elevated food prices.³⁰⁷ As of March 2026, the cost of the food basket was 280 percent higher than five years ago,³⁰⁸ with the Middle East conflict contributing to an 18 percent increase from February to May 2026.³⁰⁹ This exacerbates already strained economic conditions resulting from the 2025 earthquake, conflict, labour shortages and power disruptions, and could substantially increase the number of people facing acute food insecurity.^{310, 311}

A total of 12.4 million people (23 percent of the population analysed) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2026 lean season, including almost 1 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4).³¹²

Around 360 000 children aged 6–59 months were assessed to be acutely malnourished through September 2026.³¹³ In September 2025, acute malnutrition analysis identified two townships in the critical phase and 157 in alert, with further deterioration projected, including one township projected to deteriorate to extremely critical levels.³¹⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Myanmar 2026 HNRP calls for USD 184 million for food security interventions and USD 55 million for nutrition interventions.³¹⁵

- Scale up life-saving food assistance in conflict-affected areas, targeting the most vulnerable households to improve both physical and economic access to food, with assistance modalities adapted to market functionality and security conditions through a mix of in-kind and cash-based assistance.
- Deliver time-critical emergency food production support, prioritizing the rapid provision of crop, livestock and fisheries inputs to protect, restore and improve household food production capacities and reduce reliance on negative coping strategies.
- Maintain the emergency nutrition response in the most severe areas, prioritizing life-saving treatment for children with severe acute malnutrition and targeted support for moderate acute malnutrition, while prioritizing resources towards the most severe needs over broader preventive interventions.



East Africa

South Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, macroeconomic challenges, flooding, dry conditions

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain extremely severe during the outlook period, driven by escalating conflict, extreme humanitarian access constraints, climatic shocks, low agricultural production and macroeconomic challenges, with populations in Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Akobo and Nyirol counties at risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario.

Conflict and insecurity will remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity, with intensifying clashes, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile, continuing to displace households and disrupt markets and livelihoods, in a context where over 2.5 million people are already internally displaced, and 1.3 million returnees and refugees have arrived from the Sudan since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, as of April 2026.^{316, 317} Humanitarian access constraints are at extreme levels³¹⁸ due to insecurity, access denials and movement restrictions, increasing the risk of worsening food security outcomes in conflict-affected areas.³¹⁹

Climate conditions are expected to have mixed impacts during the outlook period. Below-average rainfall forecast for June–September, in line with El Niño conditions, may reduce flooding in flood-prone areas along the Nile, particularly in Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states. However, this may also disrupt typical flood-recession livelihoods and constrain crop and pasture regeneration, while contributing to localized crop losses and reduced livestock productivity in eastern parts of the country, where drier conditions are likely to prevail.^{320, 321}

Macroeconomic conditions are expected to remain challenging, with a weak South Sudanese pound and inflation projected at around 15.8 percent in 2026.³²² Despite improved domestic cereal production in 2025,³²³ food prices remain extremely high. In Juba, sorghum prices recorded a 20 percent increase year-on-year in April 2026, and maize prices remained high.³²⁴ During the outlook period, prices are projected to remain high and volatile³²⁵ due to reliance on imports and increasing global fuel and food costs,³²⁶ while rising inflation and limited incomes will continue to reduce purchasing power.

From April to July 2026, 7.8 million people (55 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC

Phase 3 or above), including 2.5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 73 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) by July 2026 in Akobo, Fangak, Nyirol and Uror counties in Jonglei State, and Luakpiny/Nasir and Ulang counties in Upper Nile State. Populations in Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang, Akobo and Nyirol counties are facing a credible risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario, particularly if conflict intensifies, flooding worsens and humanitarian access remains constrained.³²⁷ Acute malnutrition continues to deteriorate, with an estimated 2.2 million children aged 6–59 months affected, representing approximately 90 000 additional cases requiring treatment, including around 697 000 cases of severe acute malnutrition, alongside approximately 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women requiring treatment.³²⁸ Severe funding shortfalls, combined with extreme humanitarian access constraints,³²⁹ are limiting the scale and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, leaving significant gaps in food security, nutrition and emergency agricultural responses.³³⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The South Sudan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 410.6 million for food security interventions and USD 128 million for nutrition interventions.³³¹

- Scale up life-saving food assistance to populations facing Catastrophe and Emergency levels of acute food insecurity as well as populations at risk of Famine, prioritizing the most vulnerable and hard-to-reach areas.
- Scale up immediate and integrated life-saving nutrition interventions for women and children in areas classified as Critical and Extremely Critical for acute malnutrition, complemented with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and protection interventions (including gender-based violence prevention).
- Prioritize market-based response modalities by expanding cash- and voucher-based assistance in locations with functional and accessible markets, while reserving in-kind food assistance for areas

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

experiencing extreme market disruption, insecurity or humanitarian access constraints.

- Scale up nutrition programming combined with cash-based assistance to support dietary diversity and reduce the risk of relapse among children recovering from acute malnutrition.
- Enhance emergency agricultural support and diversified livelihood opportunities to improve household food

production, reduce reliance on seasonal agriculture and recurrent emergency assistance, and promote income diversification.

Other actions

- Advocate for an immediate cessation of hostilities and unhindered humanitarian access to prevent a further deterioration in acute food insecurity.



East Africa

Somalia

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: drought, high food prices, conflict

Somalia is facing critical levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition due to drought, conflict, displacement and rising food prices, with Burhakaba District at risk of Famine.³³² Further deterioration is possible due to continued conflict and potential economic shocks,³³³ humanitarian access constraints and low humanitarian funding.³³⁴

The October–December 2025 *Deyr* rains largely failed,^{335,336} marking the second or third poor season across parts of Somalia.³³⁷ In the south, crop production was the lowest since 1995 (83 percent below average),³³⁸ reducing cereal supplies until the next harvest in July. Poor rains caused severe pasture and water deficits, with livestock losses of up to 5–10 percent.³³⁹ This, combined with rising fuel prices, transport costs and imported food prices, linked to the 2026 Middle East conflict and rejection of the Somali shilling by traders in the south, have driven sharp food price increases.³⁴⁰ Sorghum and maize prices in April were up to 66–85 percent higher than last year.³⁴¹

The April–June *Gu* season has started very poorly, with a delayed onset, high temperatures and below-average cumulative totals as of mid-May, extending drought impacts.^{342,343} Simultaneously, upstream alerts suggest increased flood risks in May along the Shabelle River.³⁴⁴ El Niño may drive above-average October–December rains, aiding drought recovery but also raising flood risks.³⁴⁵

Conflict remains a major driver of acute food insecurity, with nearly 32 000 people displaced by conflict in the first quarter of 2026. Nonetheless, drought-related shocks accounted for the vast majority of displacement during the period.³⁴⁶ Recently, violence in Southwest State displaced 45 000 people,^{347,348} disrupting trade and agricultural activities in the cereal belt. Political tensions in federal member states continue to trigger local clashes.³⁴⁹ Between April–June 2026, an additional 304 000 people are expected to be displaced from drought, flooding and conflict combined.³⁵⁰

From April to June 2026, around 6 million people (31 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), a 10 percent increase compared with the same period in 2025. This includes nearly 1.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).³⁵¹ Through December 2026, nearly 1.9 million children are expected to be acutely malnourished, including 493 000 suffering from severe acute malnutrition.³⁵²

Of particular concern is Burhakaba District, recording a 37.1 percent GAM and at risk of Famine under a plausible worst-case scenario of failing *Gu* rains, soaring food prices and limited humanitarian assistance.³⁵³



RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Produce and disseminate early-warning messages to inform preparedness activities ahead of forecast risks and hazards such as floods.
- Provide pre-emptive cash-based assistance to vulnerable households to mitigate the impact of forecast hazards such as floods and drought.
- Provide agricultural inputs (crop and livestock), livestock treatment and vaccination ahead of El Niño-induced flooding or drought.

Emergency response

The Somalia 2026 HNRP calls for USD 301 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 75 million for nutrition interventions.³⁵⁴

- Implement integrated cash+ emergency responses, combining unconditional cash assistance with quality, time-sensitive agricultural, livestock and fisheries inputs to stabilize food consumption while preventing irreversible loss of productive assets.
- Provide life-saving food assistance through emergency unconditional cash and voucher assistance and in-kind rations to ensure immediate access to food, prioritizing populations in Emergency or worse (IPC Phase 4 or above), particularly vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, IDPs and households with members with disabilities.
- Rehabilitate critical water infrastructure through cash-for-work schemes while providing short-term income.
- Scale up the nutrition response in the most severe areas (IPC AMN Phases 4 and 5), prioritizing life-saving treatment for severe acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age in districts with the highest burden, while maintaining targeted moderate acute malnutrition support in these areas.
- Strengthen protection measures for newly displaced populations, with a specific focus on women and girls, whose vulnerability is heightened by asset loss, disrupted livelihoods and weakened community support mechanisms.



Latin America and the Caribbean

Haiti

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: gang violence, economic crisis, dry conditions

Elevated levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist. Widespread gang violence is driving further internal displacement and worsening humanitarian access, a trend expected to continue during the outlook period. The persistent economic crisis and forecasted dry conditions, compounded by significant funding gaps, will further undermine access to and availability of food over the outlook period.

Gang territorial control continues to expand beyond the capital, Port-au-Prince, and the Artibonite and Centre departments, with armed groups securing control over critical sea and road routes.³⁵⁵ This has resulted in worsening humanitarian access in areas affected by gang presence, from high to very high constraints in late 2025,³⁵⁶ and increasing internal displacement, which reached a record 1.5 million people in December 2025³⁵⁷ and continued to rise in the first three months of 2026.^{358, 359, 360} Despite the expected deployment of the new Gang Suppression Force to enhance counter-gang operations in April 2026,³⁶¹ violence and insecurity are expected to persist during the outlook period.

The economy is forecast to contract for the eighth consecutive year in 2026,³⁶² as widespread violence continues to affect investment and private consumption. Increased forced returns from neighbouring countries will lead to a reduction in remittances,³⁶³ further reducing household income sources. Despite the recent deceleration, the annual food inflation rate stood at 24 percent in February 2026,³⁶⁴ continuing to limit vulnerable households' access to food, while headline inflation is forecast at 23.5 percent in 2026.³⁶⁵ The recent increase in fuel prices arising from the Middle East conflict, and the resulting rise in transport fares, is likely to further strain economic activity and erode household purchasing power.^{366, 367}

Weather forecasts point to a high likelihood of below-average rainfall between June and August,³⁶⁸ conditions generally associated with the El Niño phenomenon,³⁶⁹ which coincides with the harvest of the main *printemps* season and the planting of the minor *automne* season.³⁷⁰ The projection period overlaps with the hurricane season, and despite forecasts of below-average hurricane activity,³⁷¹ any damage caused by adverse weather conditions poses additional risks to

agricultural production, which has been diminishing due to the combined effects of insecurity, limited access to inputs and weather shocks, including Hurricane Melissa in late 2025. Overall agricultural output remains insufficient to meet food needs, keeping food availability and access constrained.³⁷²

Between March and June 2026, over 5.8 million people (52 percent of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) – the highest number since IPC analyses began in Haiti in 2013. This includes 1.8 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).^{373, 374}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate early-warning messages along with tailored advice to help communities protect lives, livelihoods and food security ahead of anticipated shocks such as droughts or hurricanes.
- Provide unconditional anticipatory cash-based assistance to enable at-risk households to take action, such as reinforcing shelters, relocating assets ahead of hurricanes or securing water and feed ahead of drought.
- Distribute hazard-specific crop and livestock inputs, such as drought-tolerant seeds, fertilizer and supplementary cattle feed for drought conditions, or flood-tolerant, short-cycle seed varieties ahead of hurricane-induced flooding.
- Distribute high-nutrient animal feed, administer animal health treatments, and undertake vaccination and parasite control campaigns to pre-emptively protect livestock health and body condition ahead of anticipated hazards (drought, hurricanes and floods).
- Implement partial or early harvesting to reduce stocking density and oxygen demand in anticipation of declining water levels for aquaculture and fisheries.
- Strengthen sustainable water management systems, such as water harvesting and storage, to aid farmers during dry periods.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

Emergency response

The Haiti 2026 HNRP calls for USD 423.5 million for food security interventions and USD 40.7 million for nutrition interventions.³⁷⁵

- Provide emergency food assistance to extremely vulnerable populations (IPC Phase 3 or above), including IDPs, and specifically target women, children and other vulnerable groups through food distributions or cash-based assistance.
- Scale up emergency food production support by combining cash with the provision of improved short-cycle vegetable seeds and staple crops, fishing kits or livestock kits alongside basic animal health support to protect productive assets and ensure rapid food access.
- Maintain and scale up the delivery of treatment for acute malnutrition in access-constrained areas through the deployment of integrated mobile clinics, specifically in hard-to-reach areas or regions heavily impacted by population displacement, to maintain the continuity of essential services.



Near East and North Africa

Sudan

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic crisis

For the period June–September 2026, a risk of Famine has been identified in 14 areas across North Darfur, South Darfur and South Kordofan under a reasonable worst-case scenario, characterized by intensified conflict and further restrictions on humanitarian access and the movement of goods and people. All areas except Beliel locality in South Darfur are expected to remain at risk of Famine through January 2027.^{376, 377, 378} During the outlook period, conflict is likely to continue driving displacement, market disruptions and low agricultural production, sustaining extreme levels of acute food insecurity.

Intense multifront fighting is likely to continue and expand, with violence continuing at high levels in Greater Kordofan and Darfur regions,³⁷⁹ while increased drone attacks³⁸⁰ are resulting in new displacement and damaged infrastructure,³⁸¹ and escalating clashes are reported in Blue Nile State.³⁸² More than 9 million people were displaced as of February 2026, a 22 percent decline compared with peak levels in early 2025. This was driven by the return of nearly 4 million people, mainly to Khartoum and Al Jazirah states,³⁸³ due to abating conflict in those areas. Displacement levels are likely to remain high as insecurity and violence persist and intensify in other areas.

The internal conflict continues to drive the economic crisis, with the Sudanese pound depreciating by around 58 percent year-on-year on the parallel market as of April 2026, contributing to high inflation.³⁸⁴ The Middle East conflict has further exacerbated inflationary pressures by contributing to sharp increases in fuel, imported food and fertilizer prices, amid heightened import and transportation costs. In particular, commercial diesel prices increased by 55 percent between March and April 2026, while wheat flour prices rose by 17.5 percent over the same period.³⁸⁵ High fuel prices and elevated transportation and production costs have also continued to sustain upward pressure on domestically produced staple foods, with sorghum and millet prices in May reaching up to four and six times, respectively, their pre-conflict levels in March 2023.³⁸⁶ These pressures may be compounded by a high likelihood of El Niño-induced dry conditions, particularly in key south-eastern producing areas, potentially affecting yields of 2026 crops, to be harvested later in the year.^{387, 388} Cereal production in 2025 was already estimated at below-average levels.^{389, 390}

During the outlook period, as the lean season peaks in August and September, the number of people facing high

levels of acute food insecurity is likely to increase beyond the 19.5 million people estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 5 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), through May 2026, although a nationwide projection was not possible due to data gaps. The population projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to increase from 135 000 people in 15 areas in February–May to 200 000 people in 19 localities in June–September 2026.³⁹¹

Severe funding cuts could exacerbate already extreme humanitarian access constraints.^{392, 393} Acute malnutrition will continue to deteriorate, with nearly 825 000 cases of severe acute malnutrition in 2026, up 7 percent compared with 2025 and 25 percent above pre-conflict levels (2021–2023).³⁹⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Sudan 2026 HNRP calls for USD 1.5 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 471.7 million for nutrition interventions.³⁹⁵

- Scale up life-saving food assistance, particularly in areas classified in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5), combining cash and voucher assistance, in-kind food distributions and ready-to-eat meals, and deploying rapid delivery mechanisms in hard-to-reach and besieged locations to ensure immediate access for newly displaced populations, protracted IDPs and highly affected host communities facing extreme hunger.
- Implement time-critical livelihood and emergency agricultural support through the delivery of crops, livestock and fisheries inputs to stabilize local food availability and protect remaining productive assets among vulnerable households.
- Sustain a comprehensive emergency nutrition response, including preventive, therapeutic and micronutrient interventions for women and children, alongside rehabilitation of critical nutrition and water infrastructure where feasible to support continuity of services.

Other actions

- Advocate for peace and cessation of hostilities, and ensure safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access, particularly in areas facing risk of Famine.

Near East and North Africa

Palestine

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse

In the Gaza Strip, acute food insecurity has improved since the October 2025 ceasefire, although it remains fragile amid the continued low-intensity conflict. The resumption of local food production, restoration of livelihoods and reduction of aid dependency remain contingent on safe, stable and unhindered commercial and humanitarian flows.

Despite limited improvements, including fewer people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) and the ceasefire in October 2025, Gaza's trajectory remains uncertain. Nearly the entire population remains dependent on humanitarian food assistance. Sustained, expanded and unhindered access to humanitarian and commercial flows will remain essential, alongside a durable resolution to the conflict and the restoration of critical infrastructure and livelihoods.

The April 2026 Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment estimated USD 1.4 billion in damages and USD 1.5 billion in losses to the agriculture and food system in the Gaza Strip, with over 95 percent of agricultural infrastructure destroyed.³⁹⁶ Reduced aid and commercial inflows continue to disrupt the agrifood system, limiting availability and driving price increases. Humanitarian and commercial trucks entering the Gaza Strip declined sharply to 142 in April 2026, down from 230 in February, further straining already fragile market stability and food security.³⁹⁷

No new IPC analysis has been published in 2026 to reflect the current situation in the Gaza Strip. According to the IPC analysis published in December 2025, between December 2025 and mid-April 2026, 1.6 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 571 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 1 900 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5), with the entire territory facing a risk of Famine under a worst-case scenario during this period.³⁹⁸ Approximately 101 000 children are expected to face acute malnutrition through mid-October 2026, of whom 31 percent are projected to be severely malnourished.³⁹⁹

In the West Bank, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate amid displacement, market disruptions and economic strain. Restricted access to land and agricultural inputs, high costs and limited feed availability are driving

negative coping strategies.⁴⁰⁰ A 2025 FAO survey found that an estimated 72 000 families, or two-thirds of agricultural households in the West Bank, are in need of emergency agricultural assistance.^{401, 402} Escalating violence, movement restrictions, demolitions of homes and displacement of civilian populations continue to undermine agricultural livelihoods, market access and food availability.^{403, 404, 405}

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2026 Flash Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, covering the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, calls for USD 1.3 billion for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 231.6 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁰⁶

Gaza Strip

- Continue providing life-saving food assistance to households through in-kind distributions or cash-based modalities, ensuring coverage of approximately 90 percent of daily caloric needs.
- Enable the rapid restoration of food production by supporting farmers, livestock herders and fishers in accessing inputs and tools (in-kind or cash) while rehabilitating greenhouses, orchards, fisheries and water infrastructure to restart local food production.
- Support reactivation of local markets by liberalizing the importation of production inputs – starting with non-dual-use materials – and providing cash-based assistance for the revival of small and micro food enterprises (processing, milling, dairy, packaging and other services) to generate income and restore local food production and availability.
- Expand the Cash-for-Work and Job Creation Programme to provide emergency employment to skilled and unskilled individuals, supporting the operation of community kitchens and the rehabilitation of productive assets.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

- Deliver emergency multipurpose cash assistance and essential shelter support to vulnerable households, prioritizing those headed by older women, children or persons with disabilities.
- Scale up the provision of supplementary food for children and pregnant or breastfeeding women at risk of acute malnutrition, including the distribution of date bars and high-energy biscuits.
- Sustain and restore local food production of agricultural households in Gaza, including through the facilitation of essential agricultural inputs, safe access to agricultural land and restoration of access to fishing areas.
- Support livelihood and market recovery by linking food aid with local procurement, supporting small agribusinesses and cooperatives (especially female- and youth-led) to restart processing, marketing and value-chain activities.
- Support community resilience and risk reduction through tailored in-kind and technical support schemes that promote climate-smart practices and social inclusion.
- Expand time-bound cash-based assistance to vulnerable refugee households, combining short-term cash-for-work opportunities that ensure inclusive participation of women and persons with disabilities with targeted cash transfers to enable the purchase of insulation materials and essential supplies through local markets.

West Bank

- Distribute monthly food assistance, including emergency food vouchers, to households affected by new shocks on food security, including destruction of productive assets, to stabilize immediate food consumption.
- Support farmers and livestock holders in accessing inputs and tools (through in-kind or conditional cash-based assistance) while rehabilitating greenhouses, orchards and water infrastructure to protect and increase the resilience of food production systems.
- Scale up emergency multipurpose cash assistance and tailored emergency shelter assistance to displaced households to prevent negative coping mechanisms

Other actions

- Advocate for all parties to the conflict to work towards a lasting resolution and to ensure safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access across the Gaza Strip to enable the large-scale delivery of humanitarian assistance and commercial supplies.



Near East and North Africa

Yemen

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: economic crisis, conflict, dry conditions, flooding

Acute food insecurity in Yemen is expected to remain among the most severe globally in 2026,⁴⁰⁷ largely driven by deteriorating economic conditions, including high food prices, internal and regional conflict and climatic hazards, including floods in some areas and forecast dry conditions in others, compounded by severe humanitarian funding shortfalls and critical operational space constraints, leading to a drastic contraction of humanitarian assistance coverage.⁴⁰⁸

Deteriorating economic conditions will continue to drive acute food insecurity across the country.⁴⁰⁹ In April 2026, staple food prices in GoY-controlled areas increased due to higher insurance costs driven by the Middle East conflict, coupled with fragile government price control measures, foreign currency shortages and transportation costs driven by rising fuel prices, with gasoline and diesel prices surging by about 24 percent month-on-month in April 2026.⁴¹⁰ In SBA-controlled areas, additional taxation has further raised retail prices of staple foods, including vegetable oil, placing significant pressure on household purchasing power.⁴¹¹ The Middle East conflict also poses risks through higher energy prices, supply disruptions and reduced remittances, which are likely to continue driving currency depreciation and food inflation, limit fuel imports and worsen food security and humanitarian situation in the country.⁴¹² Localized conflict is likely to continue to damage infrastructure, restrict movements and disrupt market access, further constraining food availability and access across affected areas.⁴¹³

Cereal crops harvested in 2025 in the highland areas are estimated at below-average levels due to unfavourable weather conditions, including erratic rainfall and localized flooding, undermining food stocks and further increasing reliance on imports. This will amplify the country's exposure to global supply chain disruptions and rising import costs.⁴¹⁴ Looking ahead, below-average rainfall in some areas and the risk of flooding in other areas during the June–September season may further constrain agricultural yield prospects.⁴¹⁵

According to the 2026 HNRP, between September 2025 and February 2026, an estimated 18.3 million people nationwide were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity. Of these, about 12.8 million people in SBA-controlled areas were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity.⁴¹⁶ At the national level 5.5 million people

were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Moreover, 41 000 people in SBA-controlled areas were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).^{417, 418} According to the latest partial analysis published in May 2026, nearly 5.4 million people in GoY-controlled areas (51 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity between June and September 2026, including 1.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). During the harvest, in October–December 2026, the number of people projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) is expected to increase to 1.8 million (17 percent of the population analysed).⁴¹⁹

In 2026, 2.2 million children are expected to be acutely malnourished, representing more than half of all children under 5 years of age. A further escalation in violence would disrupt key import flows, limit humanitarian access and exacerbate already critical levels of acute food insecurity.⁴²⁰ Humanitarian funding remains significantly below requirements, and the operational space is highly constrained, which is expected to further worsen acute food insecurity by reducing the scale of assistance to vulnerable populations.⁴²¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Yemen 2026 HNRP calls for USD 900 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 177.2 million for nutrition interventions.⁴²²

- Provide nutrition-sensitive humanitarian food assistance through in-kind and cash modalities that address both the quantity and nutritional quality of diets and meet the needs of the most vulnerable populations, including displaced populations.
- Scale up emergency agricultural and livelihoods support combining food assistance with the provision of agricultural, livestock and fisheries inputs and income-generating activities.
- Prioritize integrated nutrition interventions in districts with global acute malnutrition rates above 15 percent, combining treatment of acute malnutrition with preventive services, including supplementary feeding, micronutrient supplementation and cash or voucher assistance to reduce access barriers.

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

Other actions

- Advocate for safe and sustained humanitarian access to food-insecure populations.
- Prioritize mobile and community-based nutrition services in hard-to-reach areas, ensuring protection-sensitive, inclusive delivery with gender-based violence risk mitigation, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse and disability inclusion.
- Enhance multisectoral integration across food security, nutrition and WASH interventions to address underlying drivers of food insecurity and malnutrition prioritizing children under 5 years of age and pregnant and breastfeeding women, aligning assistance with humanitarian–development–peace nexus approaches and community-informed delivery mechanisms.

Lebanon

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic shocks

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate in Lebanon, largely driven by conflict, displacement, localized market disruptions, economic deterioration, disrupted livelihoods and declining household purchasing power.

The renewed escalation of hostilities observed since late February 2026, including large-scale military operations in southern Lebanon and extensive airstrikes across the country,⁴²³ is expected to exacerbate acute food insecurity, particularly in South and Nabatieh governorates.⁴²⁴ Insecurity has disrupted transport corridors, damaged critical infrastructure (including key bridges), constrained movement and delayed humanitarian convoys, while also undermining livelihoods and local market functioning in conflict-affected areas.⁴²⁵

In parallel, economic pressures are further constraining food access nationwide. Rising fuel prices and supply chain disruptions are placing upward pressure on food prices, reducing food affordability for vulnerable households.⁴²⁶ Global disruptions linked to the Middle East conflict are also likely to reduce remittance inflows from Gulf countries, further affecting the economy.⁴²⁷ Although national authorities report that food imports through seaports remained secured for March and April 2026, reduced purchasing power and humanitarian access constraints are expected to deepen acute food insecurity,⁴²⁸ particularly among IDPs and Syrian and Palestinian refugees. Large-scale displacement continues to force households to abandon their livelihoods, eroding income sources and purchasing power and placing additional strain on already overstretched host communities.^{429, 430}

As of early 2026, over one million people were internally displaced,^{431, 432} including Syrian and Palestinian refugees facing heightened vulnerability amid severe humanitarian access constraints⁴³³ and humanitarian funding shortfalls.⁴³⁴ Against this backdrop, between April and August 2026, approximately 1.2 million people in Lebanon, including

Lebanese residents, refugees and recent arrivals from the Syrian Arab Republic, were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity, including approximately 101 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).⁴³⁵

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2026 Flash Appeal for Lebanon calls for USD 56 million for food security and agriculture interventions and USD 4 million for nutrition interventions.⁴³⁶

- Ensure immediate access to life-saving food assistance for displaced households, especially those without cooking facilities.
- Provide food parcels, ready-to-eat and hot meals for displaced people in shelters or households with cooking capabilities, ensuring they can meet their nutritional needs.
- Scale up multipurpose cash assistance as the primary response modality to rapidly support conflict-affected displaced populations and vulnerable host communities.
- Provide emergency agricultural assistance in cash, vouchers or agricultural inputs for farming households, including IDPs, to support local food production.
- Implement integrated emergency nutrition and child development interventions, prioritizing infant and young child feeding, early childhood development and maternal nutrition through mother–baby corners, breastfeeding support, nutrition rations, micronutrient supplementation and age-appropriate feeding packages.

Other actions

- Advocate for peace and a cessation of hostilities in southern Lebanon. Advocate for safe, inclusive and unhindered access to food for the most vulnerable populations, ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not obstructed.

Southern Africa

Democratic Republic of the Congo

HOTSPOT OF VERY HIGH CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic stress, disease outbreak

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist during the outlook period, driven by conflict in eastern provinces and large-scale displacement, amid insufficient funding⁴³⁷ and ongoing cholera, mpox and Ebola outbreaks.⁴³⁸

The escalation of violence since January 2025, particularly in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri provinces, has caused widespread displacement and market collapse and worsened humanitarian access, which is assessed as extreme.⁴³⁹

As of February 2026, about 6.5 million people remained displaced and around 604 000 were refugees,⁴⁴⁰ placing the Democratic Republic of the Congo among the largest internal displacement crises globally. The Ebola outbreak reported in May in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu provinces poses an additional risk to livelihoods and may further worsen acute food insecurity due to potential disruptions to markets, mobility, labour activities and humanitarian access.⁴⁴¹

Agricultural production was constrained between January and April 2026 in conflict-affected areas by displacement, insecurity,⁴⁴² localized flooding and rainfall deficits, reducing crop output and food availability in local markets. Emerging El Niño conditions may increase the likelihood of below-average rainfall between June and September, while flood risk may persist in some flood-prone areas during the outlook period, potentially disrupting agricultural activities and market access, likely contributing to further acute food insecurity through the end of 2026.⁴⁴³

Elevated transport costs and supply chain disruptions have kept food prices high, eroding household purchasing power. Rising fuel and input costs linked to the Middle East conflict could exacerbate these trends, while food security interventions remain critically underfunded.⁴⁴⁴

About 26.5 million people (23 percent of the population analysed) were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between January and June 2026, including over 3.6 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).⁴⁴⁵ Within the eastern region, the population classified in IPC Phase 3 or above increased in South Kivu and Ituri provinces, while North Kivu and Tanganyika provinces recorded decreases in IPC Phase 3 or above population over

the period from January to June 2026, compared with the same period in 2025.

The acute malnutrition burden remains one of the highest worldwide, with 4.2 million acutely malnourished children under 5 years of age, including 1.4 million severely acutely malnourished, and 1.5 million pregnant and breastfeeding women projected to face acute malnutrition through June 2026.⁴⁴⁶

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2026 HNRP calls for USD 621.9 million for food security interventions and USD 136.1 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁴⁷

- Provide food assistance at full ration levels through in-kind food, cash or vouchers to recently displaced and shock-affected populations, while extending lean-season support to households facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) living with host communities.
- Scale up time-critical emergency agriculture support in high-severity areas (IPC Phase 3 or above), prioritizing the rapid provision of short-cycle seeds, basic tools and essential livestock services to conflict- and shock-affected rural households.
- Provide emergency supplementary feeding and nutrition services to children aged 6–23 months and pregnant or breastfeeding women facing high levels of acute food insecurity during sudden or prolonged crises.

Southern Africa

Madagascar

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: dry conditions, flooding

Acute food insecurity in Madagascar is expected to worsen during the outlook period compared with the corresponding period in 2025, with weather shocks representing the main risk factor.

The 2025/26 rainy season (October–April) started irregularly, after which rainfall distribution remained erratic, with prolonged precipitation deficits affecting the latter half of the cropping season and impacting several key crop-producing regions in western and central areas.⁴⁴⁸ The reduced rains, combined with above-average temperatures, have constrained 2026 crop yield prospects. In addition, successive tropical cyclones in early 2026 had significant impacts on the agriculture sector. In total, 174 000 hectares of cropland (about 5 percent of the national cropland area) were exposed to flooding,⁴⁴⁹ and more than 681 000 people were affected.⁴⁵⁰

The combined effects of erratic weather conditions and cyclone damage have increased the likelihood of a second consecutive below-average national paddy harvest – expected to start in the second quarter of 2026⁴⁵¹ – increasing the risk of further deterioration in acute food insecurity in the country.

About 1.8 million people (19 percent of the population analysed) in the South, Southeast, East and Northeast regions and in Antananarivo urban areas were already projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) between February and April 2026.^{452, 453} These projections were made in December 2025 and do not account for the impacts of the extreme weather events in early 2026. Without adequate support, the number of people facing acute food insecurity during the outlook period is expected to increase relative to 2025 levels, particularly among vulnerable rural households dependent on rain-fed agriculture.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2026 Flash Appeal for Madagascar calls for USD 34.9 million for food security and livelihoods interventions and USD 3.5 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁵⁴

- Deliver emergency food assistance to displaced and asset-depleted households, using in-kind food and/or cash transfers to address immediate consumption gaps among populations affected by cyclones and loss of livelihoods.
- Implement time-critical agricultural recovery support, prioritizing rural households whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, through the rapid distribution of short-cycle seeds, inputs and small equipment to enable off-season planting and accelerate food production.
- Support animal health to safeguard livelihoods and enhance food security and nutrition for vulnerable households.
- Support the restoration of livelihoods of affected fishing households through the provision of fishing equipment and technical assistance.
- Enhance preventive nutrition interventions alongside food assistance, combining supplementary rations (lipid-based nutrient supplements and fortified flours), infant and young child feeding support and micronutrient supplementation to prevent further deterioration of nutritional status among vulnerable groups.

West Africa and the Sahel

Nigeria

HOTSPOT OF HIGHEST CONCERN

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, economic shocks, dry conditions, flooding

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further during the outlook period, driven by conflict, worsening macroeconomic conditions amplified by the Middle East conflict, and climate shocks affecting production and market access.

Conflict is set to remain a critical factor in the North East, North West and North Central regions of Nigeria, with a marked deterioration reflected in a 61 percent year-on-year surge in incidents as of March 2026, further compounded by worsening trends reported in April.⁴⁵⁵ Prolonged violence in northern Nigeria is likely to continue to restrict farming and trade, as seen in Borno State, where conflict has escalated, and in the northwestern states of Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara, where 2025 cereal production is estimated to be 23–27 percent below average.^{456, 457} This is likely to reduce production and sustain displacement, with an estimated 3.7 million IDPs nationwide, approximately 2.3 million of whom are concentrated in the North East as of early April 2026⁴⁵⁸ amid very high humanitarian access constraints.⁴⁵⁹

Rising fuel prices driven by the Middle East conflict have further strained Nigeria's economy, driving gasoline prices up by 64 percent compared with January 2026. These higher fuel and fertilizer costs threaten to increase transportation costs and reduce agricultural production, driving food inflation during the outlook period.⁴⁶⁰ The combination of fuel and fertilizer shocks and conflict could create a compounding risk for the June–August lean season and beyond. Reduced humanitarian funding is already limiting assistance in areas at risk of acute food insecurity.⁴⁶¹

The 2026 rainfall forecast is mixed across the country, with below-average rainfall amounts expected in Katsina and Zamfara states, while localized flooding may affect Borno and Sokoto due to above-average precipitation. In addition, critical dry spells are projected across several northern regions between June and August. These localized climatic shocks risk further disrupting agricultural activities in key zones,^{462, 463} particularly in conflict-affected and flood-prone areas, further reducing yields.

Around 34.8 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) acute food insecurity during

June–August 2026. Of these, over 26.4 million people are in the conflict-affected North East, North West and North Central regions, which also host all 1.8 million people projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) as well as the 15 000 people projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Borno State (of whom over 8 000 are IDPs).^{464, 465}

Acute malnutrition is also expected to worsen, with about 6.4 million children aged 0–59 months projected to suffer acute malnutrition between October 2025 and September 2026, including over 2 million cases of severe acute malnutrition.⁴⁶⁶ Without scaled-up assistance, acute food insecurity is expected to further deteriorate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate early-warning messaging and tailored advisories through multiple media channels.
- Deliver an anticipatory action package that combines multipurpose cash assistance, the rehabilitation and construction of dykes with drainage clearing, alongside the distribution of diversified livestock feeds, grain and fodder storage materials, and targeted livestock vaccination and deworming interventions in flood-prone areas.
- Distribute agricultural inputs including drought-tolerant seeds.
- Establish and rehabilitate irrigation facilities and community watering points to enhance access to and availability of water for livestock and agricultural use ahead of climate shocks.

Emergency response

The Nigeria 2026 HNRP calls for USD 224.4 million for food security interventions and USD 94.4 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁶⁷

- Prioritize hyper-targeted food assistance in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, focusing life-saving in-kind and cash support for local government areas

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

classified in Emergency or worse (CH Phase 4 or above), while maintaining targeted assistance for displaced populations in hard-to-reach areas facing high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above).⁴⁶⁸

- Scale up mobile and rapid response modalities to deliver integrated severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition treatment in local government areas facing

extreme access constraints during the May–September peak malnutrition period.

- Strengthen disease surveillance, ensuring coordinated action across nutrition and health systems to mitigate the compounding impacts of cholera, acute watery diarrhoea and measles outbreaks.



West Africa and the Sahel

Mali

HOTSPOT

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: conflict, macroeconomic pressures

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain widespread in Mali during the June–August 2026 lean season, driven primarily by an escalation of armed conflict and persistent macroeconomic pressures, with deepening humanitarian access constraints and declining humanitarian funding further limiting the ability of vulnerable households to cope.

Violence has reached a critical level of intensity, with coordinated attacks in late April 2026 simultaneously targeting multiple locations across northern, central and southern Mali, including near the capital Bamako, further destabilising an already fragile security situation and disrupting livelihoods, trade flows, population movements and humanitarian operations across Kidal, Gao, Mopti and Ménaka regions.^{469, 470}

The blockade announced around Bamako has severed key supply corridors, driving up transportation costs and limiting market access for poor households, IDPs and host communities.⁴⁷¹ Insecurity and movement restrictions along major transport routes continue to constrain humanitarian and commercial access, particularly in the north and centre of the country, where more than 400 000 people were already internally displaced prior to the April escalation.^{472, 473}

Macroeconomic pressures are expected to worsen, partly driven by spillover effects from the ongoing Middle East conflict.⁴⁷⁴ Rising global fuel prices are increasing transportation and logistics costs across supply chains, and are exacerbating the ongoing energy crisis, further constraining economic activity and income opportunities for poor households.⁴⁷⁵ Rising global fertilizer prices are expected to reduce imports, with domestic fertilizer stocks remaining far below national requirements in March 2026, likely further constraining availability and access during the 2026 cropping season and negatively affecting agricultural production and rural incomes.⁴⁷⁶ A projected transition towards El Niño conditions during the second half of 2026 is expected to increase the likelihood of below-average rainfall across parts of the western Sahel, including southern Mali, with likely adverse effects on pasture conditions and agropastoral livelihoods entering the 2026/27 lean season.⁴⁷⁷

An estimated 1.6 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity

during the June–August 2026 lean season, including nearly 57 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), with the highest severity concentrated in the conflict-affected regions of Ménaka, Gao and Kidal.⁴⁷⁸ Declining humanitarian funding has forced reductions in assistance coverage across the country, further eroding the coping capacity of the most vulnerable populations.⁴⁷⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory action

- Disseminate early-warning messages with tailored advice on how to protect lives, livelihoods and food security ahead of forecast drought conditions.
- Provide livestock feed, vaccination and veterinary support to protect herders' livelihoods and livestock ahead of drought or below-average rainfall.
- Provide conditional and unconditional cash-based transfers and in-kind assistance ahead of shocks such as dry conditions.

Emergency response

The Mali 2026 HNRP calls for USD 149.4 million for food security interventions and USD 47 million for nutrition interventions.⁴⁸⁰

- Scale up life-saving food assistance to populations facing Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), prioritizing populations facing Emergency (CH Phase 4), with adequate ration sizes and sustained support throughout the lean season, particularly for displaced and conflict-affected populations.
- Ensure timely and sustained access to food for vulnerable households through context-appropriate delivery modalities, including in-kind assistance, cash-based transfers or vouchers, guided by market functionality, humanitarian access constraints and protection considerations.
- Protect and restore critical livelihoods through time-bound emergency agricultural and pastoral support, including the provision of crop and livestock

RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)

inputs, livestock feed and livelihood-support activities, to prevent further asset depletion and sustain minimum levels of food production.

- Scale up integrated nutrition interventions in high-severity areas to prevent and treat acute malnutrition, prioritizing children under five and pregnant and breastfeeding women, including through mobile and community-based service delivery in access-constrained areas.

Other actions

- Expand rapid response and shock-responsive interventions targeting displaced and conflict-affected

populations, to address sudden displacement, conflict-related shocks and climate hazards, including pre-positioning of supplies and flexible operational modalities in high-risk and hard-to-reach areas.

- Ensure access to diversified and nutritious diets for vulnerable populations through integrated food, nutrition and health interventions, including targeted supplementation, promotion of infant and young child feeding practices and strengthened linkages with health and WASH services.



Glossary

IPC/CH PHASE 5 EXPLAINED

Catastrophe and Famine both refer to IPC/CH Phase 5, indicating the most extreme food insecurity situations. However, there are key differences: **Catastrophe is a household-level classification, while Famine is an area-level classification.**

Catastrophe

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) is classified at the household level. Households in this phase experience an extreme lack of food and an exhaustion of coping capacities – facing starvation and a significantly increased risk of acute malnutrition and death. Households may be classified as Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if the broader area is not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). This occurs when less than 20 percent of the population experiences Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) conditions and/or when acute malnutrition and/or mortality levels have not yet reached the thresholds for Famine.

Famine

Famine is an area-level IPC/CH classification. For the IPC, Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households have or are most likely to have an extreme deprivation of food. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical levels of acute malnutrition are or will likely be evident. Significant mortality, directly attributable

to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease, is occurring or will likely be occurring.

In this phase:

- The prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age reaches or exceeds 30 percent global acute malnutrition by weight-for-height z-score or 15 percent by mid-upper arm circumference measurement, with evidence of rapidly worsening underlying drivers of acute malnutrition.
- Households are destitute.
- Excess mortality is prevalent, with at least two deaths per 10 000 people per day.

Famine with solid evidence

An area is classified as Famine with solid evidence when **clear and compelling data** on acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality sufficiently support the classification.

Famine with reasonable evidence

An area is classified as Famine with reasonable evidence if **two of the three thresholds** – acute food insecurity (food deprivation and livelihood collapse), acute malnutrition and mortality – have been reached, and analysts reasonably assess from the broader evidence that the third threshold is likely to have been met.

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation of a severity that threatens lives or livelihoods, regardless of the cause, context or duration. The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases, from IPC/CH Phase 1 (No/Minimal) to IPC/CH Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine). Each phase has distinct implications for where and how interventions should be prioritized.

Cadre Harmonisé

The Cadre Harmonisé (CH) is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) to analyse and identify areas and population groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

Coping strategies

Activities undertaken by people to secure food, income or other essential goods and services when their normal

livelihoods are disrupted or when shocks or hazards affect access to basic needs.

Crisis – IPC/CH Phase 3 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

In areas classified in Phase 3, households are already unable to meet their minimum food needs and either suffer from those food deficits outright or are forced to make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their future ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods. For example, they may sell significant productive assets, forgo essential healthcare, or withdraw children from school so that they can eat. As households resort to increasingly severe coping mechanisms, the typically most nutritionally vulnerable (e.g. children and pregnant and breastfeeding women) may start to bear the consequences of food consumption gaps, resulting in high or above-average acute malnutrition levels. At this point, action is needed to ensure immediate relief and support households' ability to

sustain themselves and protect families from the dilemma of making choices that will likely lead to worse outcomes in the future.

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a critical level of acute food insecurity in which households experience large food consumption gaps, often reflected in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality, or can only avoid such gaps by resorting to emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. At this phase, households face critical acute food insecurity and urgent action is required to save lives and livelihoods. Without timely intervention, affected populations risk starvation and death.

Food access

Having personal or household financial means to acquire food for an adequate diet, at a level that ensures that the satisfaction of other basic needs is not threatened or compromised, and that adequate food is accessible to everyone, including vulnerable individuals and groups.

Food availability

Having a quantity and quality of food sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals, free from adverse substances, and acceptable within a given culture, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Food security

A situation in which all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Based on this definition, four food security dimensions can be identified: food availability, economic and physical access to food, food utilization and stability over time.

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Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of tools and protocols aimed at enhancing food security and nutrition analysis to inform decisions and is the result of a partnership of organizations at global, regional and country levels. It is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

Livelihoods

The capabilities, assets, both material and social, and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being, including the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about livelihood activities.

Malnutrition

A physiological condition caused by inadequate, unbalanced or excessive consumption of macronutrients and/or micronutrients. Malnutrition includes undernutrition, micronutrient deficiencies, overweight and obesity, and the resulting diet-related noncommunicable diseases.

Risk of Famine

The IPC partnership defines ‘risk of Famine’ as the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine (IPC Phase 5) in the projected period, when Famine is not the most likely scenario. When analysts assess that the most likely scenario would result in Famine, either Famine – solid evidence or Famine – reasonable evidence will be classified, depending on the amount and quality of evidence available. By contrast, analysts may assess that in cases where Famine is not the most likely outcome, Famine would occur in an alternative scenario that has a reasonable chance of occurrence. While Famine focuses on the most likely scenario, the ‘risk of Famine’ focuses on the worst-case scenario that has a reasonable and realistic chance of happening.

Appendices

1. Selection process

The selection of hunger hotspots and other situations requiring monitoring follows a two-step approach, combining quantitative analyses with expert qualitative assessments. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity, rather than less severe forms of food insecurity or malnutrition.

Hunger hotspots are identified based on available evidence indicating that acute food insecurity is likely to worsen during the outlook period as a result of key drivers and shocks. Situations requiring monitoring are identified based on evidence of a possible deterioration in acute food insecurity, either where recent acute food insecurity data are available or where shocks indicate a credible risk of deterioration despite the absence of such data.

Quantitative analysis

The quantitative approach covers: low- and lower-middle-income countries according to the World Bank classification; countries and territories included in the Global Report on Food Crises; and a selected number of upper-middle-income countries and specific situations, including migrant-related contexts, that are monitored to ensure emerging or potential crises are not overlooked.

The methodology measures and prioritizes the expected deterioration in acute food insecurity across different contexts through a comprehensive indicator framework. It employs eight core indicators organized into two categories: current status indicators and temporal change indicators.

The current status indicators comprise:

1. The absolute number of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.
2. The prevalence of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), expressed as a percentage of the analysed population.

3. The absolute number of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The prevalence of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), expressed as a percentage of the analysed population.

The temporal change indicators assess deterioration or improvement in acute food insecurity by comparing the most recent available estimates or projections with those covering a comparable period one year earlier and produced using the same methodology. These indicators measure:

1. The change in the absolute number of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.
2. The change in the prevalence of people analysed facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), expressed as a percentage of the analysed population.
3. The change in the absolute number of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.
4. The change in the prevalence of people analysed facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4), expressed as a percentage of the analysed population.

To ensure comparability across diverse contexts, each of the eight core indicators is normalized using a distribution-based quintile method. This process ranks all countries, territories and situations with available acute food insecurity data according to each indicator's value, subsequently dividing them into five equal groups. Countries, territories and situations are assigned normalized scores from 1 (lowest severity quintile) to 5 (highest severity quintile).

Countries, territories and situations are pre-selected for inclusion in the report as hotspots through a dual-threshold approach.

First, any country, territory or situation receiving a normalized score of 5 on at least one of the four change-over-time indicators is automatically pre-selected. This captures those contexts experiencing the sharpest deterioration in any dimension of acute food insecurity. In practical terms, a score of 5 indicates that, for that specific indicator, the country, territory or situation ranks among the worst 20 percent when compared with all other countries, territories or situations for which data on that indicator is available in the database.

Second, countries, territories or situations with populations estimated or projected to experience Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) are automatically included, regardless of their performance on the change-over-time indicators, given the extreme severity of their circumstances.

This methodology is designed to identify contexts where food insecurity crises are emerging or intensifying by emphasizing both the magnitude and severity of change, thereby highlighting hotspots requiring urgent humanitarian intervention and situations requiring monitoring.

Beyond the eight acute food insecurity-focused indicators, the analysis systematically compiles complementary data on conflict dynamics, economic shocks, natural hazards, displacement and other aggravating factors, including humanitarian access constraints, agricultural seasonality patterns, coping capacity indicators, acute malnutrition rates and population displacement. These additional indicators, while not part of the normalization and ranking process, are compiled into a structured data matrix to inform the subsequent qualitative assessment. Technical experts then evaluate the pre-selected countries, territories and situations to determine the final selection of priority hotspots and other situations requiring monitoring.

Qualitative assessment

The qualitative assessment builds on the results of the quantitative analysis and integrates expert judgement to contextualize data and refine prioritization.

While the quantitative step seeks to compare acute food insecurity estimates or projections for the latest forecast period with those for a comparable period one year earlier, such comparisons are frequently constrained by:

- the absence of comparable analyses in either period, and in some cases the complete absence of data;
- variations in geographical and/or population coverage;

- differences in the reference timeframes; and
- methodological differences across analyses.

As a result, quantitative analysis alone does not always allow for a comprehensive identification of hotspots and situations requiring monitoring. The qualitative component therefore represents a critical step in the selection process, ensuring a nuanced assessment through expert discussion and contextual interpretation.

Regional consultations with technical experts inform the final selection of countries, territories and situations for inclusion in the report. Participants include food security specialists, conflict, climate and economic risk analysts, and emergency preparedness officers with regional expertise. These experts assess both the quantitative rankings and the broader humanitarian and contextual situation to ensure that the selection accurately reflects conditions on the ground. The final selection of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is based on consensus among FAO and WFP technical experts at headquarters and in the field.

The qualitative process consists of the following steps:

Regional selection meetings

FAO and WFP analysts convene regional meetings for each of the subregions covered by the report. During these meetings, participants discuss the quantitative results and complement them with a qualitative analysis of contextual drivers and risks, focusing on:

- assessing the feasibility of year-on-year comparisons and identifying any methodological, geographical or temporal limitations;
- analysing key drivers likely to affect acute food insecurity in the outlook period, including conflict, economic instability and climate-related risks, based on internal and external sources such as:
 - conflict and political risk: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data conflict events and fatalities, WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings, which are based on a range of open-source information and internal intelligence;
 - economic risk: WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings economic risk indicators, IMF and World Bank headline/food inflation rate and GDP growth rate, staple food prices from FAO Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) Food Price Monitoring and Analysis tool,

agricultural production forecasts/estimates from FAO GIEWS Crop Prospects and Food Situation/country briefs;

- climate risk: WFP Watch List and Active Early Warnings climate indicators, WFP Seasonal Outlook, FAO GIEWS Earth Observation, presence of a lean season, Group on Earth Observations Global Agricultural Monitoring and Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production/ Joint Research Centre agricultural condition indicators, and weather forecasts from the International Research Institute for Climate and Society, the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
- assessing national coping capacity using the INFORM Risk Index;
- evaluating the severity of humanitarian access constraints through the ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview index;
- examining nutrition trends, including year-on-year changes in the global acute malnutrition burden and WFP Nutrition Risk Indicator results; and
- analysing refugee trends using data from the UN Refugee Agency.

Each regional meeting concludes with a consensus-based list of countries, territories and situations proposed for inclusion in the report. The rationale for inclusion or exclusion is documented in meeting notes. In addition, countries, territories or situations that were not pre-selected may be discussed to ensure that no potentially deteriorating acute food insecurity situation is overlooked.

Final selection and validation

The regional outcomes are reviewed in a final selection meeting by the report's core team, who compare analyses across regions and with previous editions. In cases of uncertainty or discrepancy, regional analysts and technical experts are consulted to further refine the list. This process ensures technical consensus and strengthens the evidence base of the selection.

The final list of hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is cross-checked against countries identified in the Global Report on Food Crises to ensure coherence and complementarity with GNAFC products. The Global Report on Food Crises list of countries, which comprises countries/

territories that required external assistance to cope with shocks affecting food security in the preceding year, defines the primary scope of analysis when assessing the risk of food security deterioration in the Hunger Hotspots report. However, given the different reference periods of the two reports, countries and territories affected by a shock in the year of analysis but not selected in the Global Report on Food Crises are also considered for the Hunger Hotspot selection.

The number of hotspots or situations requiring monitoring may vary between editions. This reflects differences in acute food insecurity conditions and emerging risks at country, regional and global levels, as captured in the available data and the outcome of the qualitative assessment process.

Categorization of selected countries, territories and situations

Countries, territories and situations selected for inclusion in the report as hunger hotspots are those assessed as facing the highest risk of deterioration in acute food insecurity during the outlook period compared with other contexts globally, and therefore requiring the most urgent attention and action. The analysis focuses specifically on acute food insecurity, rather than less severe forms of food insecurity or malnutrition.

Hotspot countries, territories and situations are further categorized on the basis of three levels of concern:

Hunger Hotspots

Hotspots of highest concern

This category includes hotspots facing Famine or risk of Famine, and populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5). It also covers hotspots at risk of deteriorating towards catastrophic conditions, where people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) are facing worsening conditions, exacerbated by severe access constraints that could lead to an escalation in acute food insecurity and the occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

Hotspots of very high concern

These are hotspots where sizeable populations, more than 500 000 people or over 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed), are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or are classified as severely food insecure according to WFP's CARI methodology; and where the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook

period, based on the latest data available, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

Hotspots

These are hotspots where the number of people facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), or classified as moderately or severely food insecure according to WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate; and/or the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, or identified as severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology, is expected to increase during the outlook period, while remaining below 500 000 people or below 10 percent of the population analysed (with at least 50 percent of the population analysed).

Situations requiring monitoring

Several other situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots, are assessed to merit close monitoring. These include:

- Situations where data are insufficient or unavailable to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied quantitative methodology, but where a qualitative assessment of available evidence on acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition, conflict, displacement, climatic hazards, economic conditions, disease outbreaks and humanitarian-access constraints indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity during the outlook period, as determined by consensus during the regional selection meetings.
- Situations where recent acute food insecurity information is available, and where acute food insecurity is expected to persist or deteriorate during the outlook period. Although the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks indicates a lower level of concern than in countries, territories and situations selected as hunger hotspots, these situations warrant close monitoring.

No predefined quantitative thresholds are used to distinguish hunger hotspots from situations requiring monitoring. Given differences in data availability, coverage, reference periods and methodologies across contexts, the categorization relies on the combined assessment of acute food insecurity trends, contextual drivers and projected risks. Hunger hotspots represent the situations of greatest concern, requiring the most urgent attention and action, whereas situations requiring monitoring are those where risks warrant close observation during the outlook period.

Risk narrative production

The text describing conditions in hunger hotspots and situations requiring monitoring is prepared by technical experts, including food security specialists and conflict, climate and economic risk analysts. Narratives drafted by one agency are peer-reviewed by counterparts in the other to ensure interagency consensus on the key findings and final wording. Furthermore, the narratives undergo:

- a technical review by the report's core team and selected senior FAO and WFP experts to ensure technical accuracy, consistency and coherence; and
- a review of food security terminology in collaboration with colleagues from the IPC Global Support Unit.

Clearance and validation

The risk narratives and the outcome of the selection process, including the categorization of countries, territories and situations as hunger hotspots or situations requiring monitoring, are further validated through a process of review, clearance and feedback involving:

- FAO and WFP field offices; and
- FAO and WFP management and leadership.

This process helps ensure that the analysis reflects the latest available information, operational realities and contextual developments, while strengthening the accuracy, relevance and validity of the report's findings.

Further information on the methodology is available upon request.

2. Acute food insecurity data sources excluding IPC/CH by country

The report prioritizes the use of IPC/CH data to assess populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Where recent IPC/CH data are not available, estimates are derived, if available, from WFP's CARI methodology. Populations classified as moderately food insecure or severely food insecure under WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Additional sources include estimates of people in need of food and livelihood assistance from the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs).

The acute food insecurity figures presented in this report for Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic are derived from the HNRPs.

- For Myanmar, the acute food insecurity figures for 2026 are from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the Myanmar 2026 HNRP.
- For the Syrian Arab Republic, acute food insecurity numbers are based on the WFP's CARI methodology.

Data gaps and data not meeting technical requirements in countries and situations requiring monitoring

Several countries, territories or situations could not be included in this report due to a lack of updated data, because existing data did not meet the technical requirements for inclusion, or to insufficient evidence on key drivers and contextual trends indicating a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity.

In the following countries requiring monitoring in this report, data were not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the agreed methodology, but available evidence on key drivers and contextual trends indicates a credible risk of worsening acute food insecurity: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Ethiopia and Iran (Islamic Republic of).

For all other countries, territories or situations where data are available in this report, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC/CH analyses.



Notes

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The Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is a unique multistakeholder initiative bringing together humanitarian and development actors committed to addressing the root causes of food crises and promoting sustainable solutions that support prevention, preparedness and response.

Within the GNAFC framework, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system covering food security, livelihoods and value chains to identify emerging risks and inform anticipatory action.

This report was jointly prepared by the FAO Global Information and Early Warning System Team, the FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience, FAO Regional and Country Offices, the WFP Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Service, and WFP Regional and Country offices. It forms part of a series of analytical products that contribute to the generation and sharing of consensus- and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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